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ABSTRACT 
 
This master‘s thesis aims to unpack the discourses on Russian national interest (RNI) 
formation. Referring to the timeframe from 2012 to 2017, this thesis tries to answer questions 
regarding the construction of Russian national interests and seeks to understand how the 
annexation of Crimea changed discourses on national interest formation. As a territory represents 
one of the most important constitutive parts of each state, when a government decides to change 
the borders, it goes through the process of legitimisation for the particular move. This 
legitimisation is usually done through the reference to national interests therefore additional 
focus of the research is on the discursive coherence behind RNI. Rejecting the realist 
assumptions on national interests, and by combining a constructivist approach in foreign policy 
analysis and poststructuralist methods of discourse analysis, this thesis seeks to offer a 
comprehensive understanding of the RNI during Putin‘s third term. The main analysis refers to 
the official speeches and interviews of the Russian President, Prime Minister and Minister of 
Foreign Affairs. This thesis finds that several changes have occurred. Firstly, Russia has changed 
discourses on national sovereignty. Secondly, Russian world doctrine in its expansionist form 
has played an important role in national interests redefinition. Thirdly, discursive portrayal of 
Russia as a great power after the annexation of Crimea went into status maintainer direction. 
Finally, the annexation of Crimea has accelerated Russian devotion to Eastern dimension of 
foreign policy. Russia has moved into uncertain direction both internationally and domestically 
with no clear idea of its nation which leaves the concept of national interests as vague and 
uncertain.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Recent events in Russian foreign policy, such as intervention in Ukraine, have sent 
dynamics of international relations down a track different from what would have occurred 
otherwise. The annexation of Crimea has become a significant event as it represented a step in 
undermining post-cold war system. Additionally this tested boundaries of Western non-
interference and caused the feeling that the structure of East-West relations has permanently 
changed. Andrei Tsygankov in his book wrote that Winston Churchill once famously observed 
that the key to understanding Russia‘s enigma is its national interest. However, Churchill failed 
to explain what that interest was. Therefore I agree with Tsygankov when he states that it is our 
scholarly task to uncover what Russians themselves understand to be their foreign policy 
interests and objectives (Tsygankov 2010). Unfortunately, to identify Russian national interests 
clearly is not an easy task due to differing perspectives within the Russian governing structures 
and Kremlin‘s tendency to focus on immediate tactical issues at the expense of strategic thinking 
(Allison et al. 2011). According to Mankoff, the debate about what constitutes Russia‘s national 
interest remains vigorous despite the greater political centralization of the Putin years (Mankoff 
2009). 
For the international community, it almost appeared as a shock, when Russia decided to 
interfere in Ukraine in order to achieve its national goals (Becker et al. 2016). The decision to 
annex Crimea was unexpected and we are still agnostic if Russian leadership had a well-
organized plan or just decided to improvise and to use the window of opportunity. However, 
there was nothing obvious that should have triggered this particular decision on Putin‘s part, and 
no one had, at least publicly, predicted this in advance (Marten 2015). Only after interference 
could we hear that this was self-evidently a matter of national interest of the Russian Federation. 
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Furthermore in his Crimea speech Putin said that those who did not foresee the situation in 
Ukraine lacked political instinct and common sense because Russia found itself in a position it 
could not retreat from (Putin 2014a). 
 
Research Puzzle 
 
Scholars have tried to understand Russian national interest from different perspectives, 
but none of them is entirely satisfactory. It has been difficult for academics to reach a definitive 
answer regarding what Russian national interests are. Probably one of the main reasons behind 
this problem is the very nature of the concept. Aside from this issue, there is a scarcity of 
research on the discursive structure of Russian interests which may offer us a better 
understanding.  
Wendt observed that it is striking how little empirical research has been done 
investigating what kind of interests state actors actually have (Wendt 1999, p.133). Even though 
the vast amount of literature on national interests from different international relations (IR) 
perspectives is written I argue that if we want to understand complex forces around national 
interests formation we need to study discourses. Studying discourses can give us structured 
knowledge on changes and coherence. For this purpose I find approaches argued by Ole Waever 
and Lene Hansen useful. They claim that foreign policies are legitimized as necessary through 
the concept of national interest and through reference to identities. States do not have identities 
operating underneath discursive articulations and they will always be constructed through 
processes of differentiation and linking (Waever 2002, Hansen 2006). This approach focuses on 
the constitutive relationship between representations of identity, interests and foreign policies. 
Instead of assuming that national interest is about power or modernization, as theories of 
realism and liberalism in international relations tend to do, this project maintains that we need to 
study what hides behind its formation. Therefore I argue that the national interest is still 
important to explanations of international politics, but it requires adequate theorization and 
methodological approach, quite simply because ―the internal language on decisions on foreign 
policies is the language of national interest‖ (Weldes 2011, p.182).  
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When we are discussing what triggered the redefinition of Russian national interests and 
how this change was possible we should keep in mind both the academic and political fluidity of 
the concept. For example, for Putin national interest is what is good for Russians and for the 
Russian people (Putin 2016d). Furthermore he claims that national interests should be pursued 
peacefully based on the rules of international law. However, he also argues that even though it is 
not in Russia‘s interest to be in confrontation with other countries, when Russia is forced to 
protect its interests, Russia will undoubtedly defend them (Putin 2017b). Therefore this kind of 
understanding of national interests requires unpacking.  
Additionally, definitions of national interests can be very dissimilar. For example, in 
2008 Putin claimed that Crimea is not a disputed territory (Putin 2008) but six years later the 
Crimean peninsula was annexed. Therefore in 2014 Russia had found itself in a position to 
choose between different visions of national interests. One option was to comply with the 
existing borders and regulations, another option was to revise and challenge them, the third 
possible option could have been to respect international borders politically, but to try to penetrate 
them in terms of cultural diplomacy. Russia chose the second option followed by revisionist 
policies conditioned by the drastically changed understanding what is in the best interests of 
Russia. How this change happened and how it was articulated, and how coherent are discourses 
on national interests represented, will be the focus of my research.  
 
 
Research Structure 
 
Built around a research question How has the annexation of Crimea changed discourses 
on Russian national interests formation, with a sub question How coherent are discourses on 
national interests represented by Russian officials, this thesis seeks to contribute to the 
understanding of the national interest formation in Russia‘s foreign policy. The timeframe under 
analysis is short, from 2012 - 2017 and covers President‘s Putin third term. However, as the 
annexation of Crimea occurred in 2014, it represents a middle point which is an important 
moment for analysing changes. The research adopts the view that national interests are 
discursively constructed in documents produced by officials, and that language is an integral part 
of national interest itself.  I argue that the language employed in foreign policy documents, 
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military doctrines, defence strategies, and in interviews and speeches of the President, Prime 
Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs thoroughly intervene with the language of national 
interest.  
The goal of this thesis is to unpack the meanings and discuss the discourses on Russian 
national interests. I will specifically analyse the discourses around certain principles like respect 
for sovereignty and non-interference in other states‘ internal affairs as they were constantly 
repeated in numerous governmental statements and speeches. It is important to analyse if 
Russian understanding of these principles have changed as after the interference in Ukraine, 
countries in the near abroad and countries with a large Russian speaking minority feel 
threatened. I will also analyse discourses on values and their importance for Russian national 
interests formation through the concept of the Russian world. Furthermore, I find important to 
include discourses on how Russia perceives its place in the international system, and finally I 
will discuss how Russian interests have changed in terms of identity through the notions 
―Distancing from Europe‖ and ―Turn to Asia‖.  
The thesis is structured as follows. I firstly discuss existing literature on the topic with a 
focus on realist and constructivist approaches towards Russian national interests. Then I continue 
with a theoretical framework and will discuss concepts of identity and national interest from a 
constructivist position. After, I will discuss methodological framework built on post-structuralist 
discourse analysis. The decision to discuss theory and methodology in the same chapter is based 
on epistemological and ontological closeness of constructivism as a theory and post-
structuralism as a method. The final component is the analytical chapter focused on two sections: 
interests and identities that stem from domestic circumstances and interests and identities that 
stem from international circumstances. Based on empirical research I identified major themes 
within which discourses on national interests are discussed and analysed them comparatively 
before and after the events in 2014, but all in the timeline of Putin‘s third term (2012-2017). In 
the end I will discuss my conclusions.  
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LITERATURE REVIEW, THEORETICAL, AND METHODOLOGICAL 
FRAMEWORK 
 
 
Reviewing research on Russian national interests 
 
The literature review component of my dissertation aims to show how Russian national 
interest has been interpreted in different ways depending on different perspectives. An extensive 
amount of scholarly work on Russian national interests and foreign policy has been delivered 
(Clunan 2009; Hopf 2016; Tsygankov 2010; Sakwa 2016; Mankoff 2009; Laenen 2012). 
However, the two most common approaches to national interests are from the realist and 
constructivist perspectives. Therefore I will provide a brief overview from realism and 
constructivism in Russian foreign policy in order to be able to explain what is missing from these 
accounts and why we need more discursive constructivist approach to unpack and study the 
discourses behind national interest formation in Russian foreign policy.   
 
 
Views on Russian national interests from a realist perspective 
 
Some scholars note that in the field of post-Soviet studies and Russian foreign policy, 
national interests are most commonly studied in their justification function. That means that 
national interests are used instrumentally to provide legitimisation and explanation of policy 
decisions. This usage of national interests follows realist logic according to which the main 
purpose of national interests is seen primarily rhetorically, used by governing structures in order 
to provide justification for certain decisions and to mobilise support for them (Laenen 2012). Or 
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like one of the most influential scholars of realism in international relations Hans Morgenthau 
wrote ―There can be no successful foreign policy which cannot be justified by the national 
interest‖ (Morgenthau 1949, p.210). 
The realist school of thought sees the national interest in terms of some basic assumptions 
about human nature, the nature of international relations and the motivations of states. For 
example, the main goal for each statesman is to achieve national interests which are usually 
defined in terms of power, as well as strategic and economic capability. For realists, national 
interest is given, unchangeable and represents a driving force of foreign policy. They use famous 
analogy with states as billiard balls, meaning that it is not important what is happening in 
domestic affairs and therefore neglect many important questions. The main idea is that anarchy 
makes security the leading foreign policy concern of states. Security, in turn, requires the 
acquisition and rational management of power and only policies conducted in this spirit can 
serve the national interest (Griffiths & O‘Callaghan 2002). Anarchy does not allow states to 
develop honourable and friendly relations and therefore in international politics we are never 
certain about other's intentions.  
Morgenthau claimed that power is the immediate aim of international politics. Whenever 
ruling elite tries to realise their interests by the means of international politics they do so by 
striving for power (Morgenthau 1948). To sum up, for realists international politics, is the 
struggle for power which follows Clausewitz's famous aphorism that war is nothing but the 
continuation of political relations by other means. Spheres of influence and great power 
management are the most important notions in realist interpretation of foreign policy. As 
Makarychev argues these are reflected in the Kremlin‘s eagerness to be recognized in the West 
as a legitimate hegemon in the region (Makarychev 2014). 
That great powers fear each other is an important characteristic of the international 
system and according to realists fear still shapes relations between Russia and the West. That is 
why some scholars argue that the international system‘s incentives have the biggest influence on 
national interest formation during Putin‘s third term. For example, in his article Why the Ukraine 
Crisis Is the West‘s Fault, Mearshimer claimed that the United States and its European allies 
share most of the responsibility for the crisis. Crimean operation is just a response to the threats 
that came from international structure. By this logic, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation‘s 
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(NATO) enlargement and European Union‘s (EU) eastwards expansion could not be tolerated by 
Russia. Furthermore Mearshimer claims that events in 2014 should not have come as a surprise: 
―After all, the West had been moving into Russia‘s backyard and threatening its core 
strategic interests. Elites in the United States and Europe have been blindsided by events 
only because they subscribe to a flawed view of international politics. They tend to 
believe that the logic of realism holds little relevance in the twenty-first century and that 
Europe can be kept whole and free on the basis of such liberal principles as the rule of 
law, economic interdependence, and democracy‖ (Mearsheimer 2014, p.77). 
 However, this explanation has few shortcomings. First, there is the question of why 
Russia did not interfere in Ukraine militarily for more than a decade, as NATO enlargement 
started in 1999. The argument that Russia was too weak until 2014 is disputable because Russia 
launched two wars in Chechnya and employed larger military might than during the annexation 
of Crimea. Another problem with the realist approach is that it fails to explain cooperation 
between Russia and the West, especially the period of so called reset of relations between Russia 
and United States during Medvedev‘s term as a president. Back then Barack Obama and Dmitry 
Medvedev agreed cooperation based on what they considered is in the national interest of their 
respective countries (McFaul & Sestanovich 2014). 
According to Mankoff even though Russia had problems to define itself in terms of 
identity after the dissolution of Soviet Union, it was easier for the Russian elite to consolidate 
about Russia‘s international role as they were still led by Soviet perceptions. They inherited the  
view that Russia is a great power country with national interests that stretch around the world 
and with a right to be consulted on a wide variety of international issues (Mankoff 2009). 
According to Makarychev, Russian foreign policy has a realist background and sympathy for this 
approach was proven by the latest assertive policies first annexation of Crimea, and interference 
in eastern Ukraine (Makarychev 2014).  
 It is important to note that realist approaches will differently answer to the question how 
much power for a state is enough. Defensive realists like Kenneth Waltz maintain that the goal of 
each state is simply to survive and maintain status-quo, and furthermore, that it is unwise to seek 
to maximize the share of world power (Waltz 1979). On the other hand, offensive realists like 
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John Mearsheimer take the opposite view. Following the offensive realist‘s logic states like 
Russia will act rationally to achieve military hegemony if conditions are right. Their goal is to 
dominate other states because domination can ensure survival and will lead to maximization of 
the share of world power. For Mearshimer power is the currency of great-power politics, and 
states compete for it among themselves. The ultimate aim of Russia would then be to become a 
hegemon. Hegemony means domination of the system, but not necessarily entire world, it is 
possible to apply the concept more narrowly on particular regions, such as Europe, Southeast 
Asia, and the Western Hemisphere or Eastern Europe (Mearsheimer 2001). In the great power 
thinking, once a country achieves an exalted position, it will become a status quo power 
(Mearsheimer 2001). The concept of status quo is important and implies a defensive concern 
with state stability. For example Sakwa concludes that Russian interests during Putin‘s third term 
are formulated to preserve the status quo: Russia under Putin is a profoundly conservative power 
and its actions are designed to maintain the status quo (Sakwa 2016, p.182). 
Since Russia‘s annexation of the Crimean Peninsula and its involvement in Eastern 
Ukraine, Putin‘s policies are increasingly described as imperial with the main interest to 
maximise power and to continue a Russian project to gradually recapture the former territories of 
the Soviet Union. For example, former US president, Barack Obama, said that Putin‘s policies 
express a deep grievance  about what he concerns to be a loss of Soviet Union, without realising 
that he is going back to practices from the Cold War times (Obama 2014). German Chancellor 
Angela Merkel compared Russian aggression to nineteenth and twentieth century imperialism 
and warned against the return of Soviet style dominance over Eastern Europe (Teper 2016). It is 
widely argued that the Russian president has never accepted the loss of superpower image that 
the Soviet Union once had, which ended with the end of Cold War. It is hard to disagree with 
this because in one of his speeches Putin referred to the dissolution of the Soviet Union as an 
unfortunate event which left many ―people overnight becoming ethnic minorities in former 
Union republics, while the Russian nation became one of the biggest, if not the biggest ethnic 
group in the world to be divided by borders‖ (Putin 2014a).  Furthermore once he described the 
collapse of the Soviet Union as "the greatest geopolitical catastrophe" of the 20th century (Putin 
2005). That is why Putin is determined to regain once lost prestige, in part by expanding the 
country‘s borders (Treisman 2016).  
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I find realism as a very useful theory which can explain the behaviour of a major power if 
we see the international system as anarchic based on self-help where power is the ultima ratio, 
rather than international norms or institutions. This theory works if international politics is a zero 
sum game meaning that each actor‘s gains or losses in international relations are equally 
balanced to the losses or gains of other actors. However it is difficult to argue zero sum game in 
the age of globalization because there are more opportunities for states to cooperate on different 
levels and different occasions. Therefore realism fails to provide explanation behind policy 
changes especially if it‘s not followed by improvement in material capabilities1.  
To sum up, realist theories in international politics assume that Russian national interests 
are exogenously predetermined, are not changeable through social interaction and will be 
pursued strategically but they are silent on the substance of those interests (Clunan 2014). 
Therefore in order to unpack the substance of the interests, not only power should be taken into 
consideration. I argue that previous knowledge, cultural belief and different ideas play an 
important role and they can give more fertile ground to explain policy changes and complex 
forces behind national interests formation. Furthermore as Makarychev noted during his third 
term, Putin‘s administration preferred to emphasize identity rather than material interests. 
Discourses on protecting Russian speakers and the return of historical territories are the proof 
that Russia‘s discourses are more identity-driven than grounded in rationality and economic 
calculus (Makarychev 2014).  That is why I find necessary to include more constructivist 
explanations into analysis. 
 
 
Views on Russian national interests from constructivist perspective 
 
Scholars under the constructivist approach provide a different understanding of national 
interests depending on the different visions of Russian identity and the role of Russia in the 
world. They also propose divergent Russian foreign policy lines, based on different diagnoses of 
Russian interests and identity. Clunan for example argues that after the dissolution of Soviet 
                                                          
1
 Like at the times of the transition of power from Kozyrev to Yevgeny Primakov. The country‘s economic decline 
continued, and there was hardly a material basis for developing a more assertive foreign policy, but still Russia 
became more assertive (Tsygankov 2016). 
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Union, political elites could not agree on Russian purpose in the world, therefore they largely 
relied on history and defined national interest as maintaining international status. She claims that 
Russia is the case where aspirations derived from the past have become the driving force of 
national identity. Despite political stabilisation in Putin‘s era the pursuit of great power status 
remained the common denominator in political elite for definitions of Russia‘s national interests 
and identity. She further argued after the dissolution of Soviet Union Russia‘s identity and 
interests have been framed in relation to three groups: the great powers, the West, and the former 
Soviet republics (Clunan 2009)  
Sakwa on the other hand argued that Russia with recent changes in foreign policy had to 
stop the United States in ―defining red lines‖. Russian interests are not to establish a Greater 
Russia or revive the Soviet empire. According to Sakwa Russian motivation to interfere in 
Ukraine is to defend the idea of Greater Europe
2
 and Russia‘s national interests (Sakwa 2016). 
However, as Makarychev argues, by interference in Ukraine Russia voluntarily gave up of the 
concept Wider Europe which could have been used to establish non-confrontational relationship 
with its neighbours (Makarychev 2014). I argue that interference in Ukraine largely discredited 
faith in Russian good intentions in near abroad. States in the region still perceive some Russian 
interests as selfish and hegemonic. For example, in order to balance against Russia‘s power, 
central Asian states increasingly seek to strengthen their ties with China. Even before the 
annexation of Crimea, Uzbekistan withdraw its membership in the Collective Security Treaty 
Organization (CSTO) as a signal of its dissatisfaction with Russia (Tsygankov 2016). Therefore, 
the Ukraine crisis was proof that Russia failed to translate its influence into stability in the Post-
Soviet space, and I find it necessary to add discursive analysis on how Russia sees the near 
abroad through the notion of Russian world which will be discussed later. 
Following Shin‘s argument scholars under the constructivist approach adopt different cri-
teria for categorizing Russian foreign policy orientations: 
―This categorization ranges from two orientations (Westernism / Eurasianism), three 
(Liberalist or Atlanticist or Liberal internationalist / Pragmatic Nationalist or Eurasianist / 
                                                          
2
  According to Sakwa ―Greater Europe is a way of bringing together all corners of the continent to create what 
Mikhail Gorbachev in the final period of the Soviet Union had called the Common European Home. This is a 
multipolar and pluralistic concept of Europe, allied with but not the same as the Atlantic community. In Greater 
Europe there would be no need to choose between Brussels, Washington or Moscow― (Sakwa 2016). 
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Patriotic Nationalist or Derzhavniki), four (Pro-Westernist or Moderate Liberalist / 
Centrist or Moderate Conservatives / Neo Communist / the Extreme right Nationalist), to 
even five (Expansionists / Civilizationists / Stabilizers / Geo economists / Westernizers 
according to geopolitical thinking in this case (Shin 2007, p.1)‖. 
However three traditions of thought on Russia‘s worldview and its interests offer the 
starting point for further study on Russian national interest formation from constructivist point of 
view and I will discuss them further. According to Tsygankov these three traditions are Statism, 
Westernism and Civilisationsim (Tsygankov 2016), for Shin they are West-oriented Liberalism, 
Pragmatic Statism, and Tradition-oriented Nationalism, and Hopf refers to them as Liberal, 
Centrist and Conservative tradition (Hopf 2016).  Each of these forms of thought outlines 
different diagnosis of Russian national interests and Russian identity but debates among them 
present good foundation for further analysis of the most recent events in Russian foreign policy. 
All three approaches have been present in post-soviet foreign policy thinking and have the 
influence on the policy formulation, but which one will have the biggest impact on the national 
interest formation depends on the leadership and international context. For example in the 
current context, during Putin‘s third term national interests are influenced primarily by statist but 
also by civilisationist understanding of Russian foreign policy.  
Westernism/ West-oriented Liberalism/ Liberal tradition understands Russia as a part of 
liberal world based on market economy, democracy and respect for human rights. It is close to 
classical liberal paradigm in traditional international relation theories. This approach had a major 
influence in defining Russian foreign policy under the Andrei Kozyrev
3
, according to this view 
Russia is one of the agents in the West centred system (Shin 2007). The emphasis is on Russia‘s 
similarity with the Western civilisation and therefore Russia should seek national interests in 
terms of integration with Western economic and security institutions.  Priority over great power 
status and distinctive Russian identity is given to the economic development. This view argues 
that Russia‘s interests in the near abroad should be negligible as Russia does not have major 
economic gains there.  Accordingly, Russia is understood in civic national, not ethno national 
                                                          
3
 Kozyarev was ready to develop relations with United States similarly as Germany and France did after the World 
War II. According to Kozyarev: ―It also must be understood that a firm and sometimes aggressive policy of 
defending one‘s national interests is not incompatible with partnership. Germany and France have shown that 
national interests can be pursued by cooperation instead of war. It would be naive to expect anything else when 
talking about great nations, especially unique ones, like Russia and the United States‖ (Kozyrev 1994). 
12 
 
terms (Hopf 2016). For example, during Kozyrev time when Westernist tradition dominated 
foreign policy thinking, the key components of national interests were economic reform, rapid 
membership in the Western international institutions, and isolationism from the former Soviet 
states. Leadership even introduced the concept ―little Russia‖ to justify little, if any, 
responsibility for the former Soviet region (Tsygankov 2016).   
However, the Westernist view on national interests formation was difficult to justify and 
was quickly discredited by Russian realities during the 90s such as economic collapse and 
corruption during privatization. There is an opinion that engaging with the West under 
Westernist discourse was an indication that Russia lacked a strategy on how to pursue its 
national interests and to understand what these interests are after the dissolution of Soviet Union. 
For example Mankoff wrote that Kozyrev even asked Nixon, ‗‗if you can advise us on how to 
define our national interests, I will be very grateful to you‘‘(Mankoff 2009, p.29). Westernist 
discourses had a short come back during Medvedev‘s presidency, but the support for Westernist 
understanding of what Russia should become seems lost. 
The Statism/ Pragmatic Statism/ Centrist approach understands Russia as one of the most 
influential countries in the world with a power to manage world affairs. Main national priorities 
are both economic development and military modernization as they are crucial for restoration of 
great power status  (Hopf 2016). This tradition has started during Primakov‘s time and inspired 
him to set two main national interests. First one to balance the United States‘ hegemonic unipolar 
aspirations in a coalition with other states and second to  integrate the former Soviet region under 
tighter control from Moscow (Tsygankov 2016). Westernism is declared to be a period of naïve 
romanticism, priority is given to the concepts like major power status and an equal, mutually 
beneficial partnership with the United States and Europe (Mankoff 2009). Statist approach has 
the main aim to recapture the greatness of Russia. This perspective holds that the West should 
recognise Russia‘s inherited privileged position in international system (Shin 2007). 
The main threat for Russian national interests according to this view is the unipolar world 
where Russia would not have an independent voice. That is why cooperation with Europe and 
the United States based on the principle of absolute power equality is possible and desirable. 
Russian national interest should include combination of both cooperation and balancing policies 
for the purpose of undermining the unipolarity (Tsygankov 2016). Even though statist approach 
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provided outlines for regaining Russia‘s lost identity and prestige, it failed to produce a long 
wanted outcome. Domestically, statists gained support for the identity of great power and strong 
Russia, however they were completely disregarded internationally by the Others namely the 
West. According to Shin ―the main reason behind this is the wide disparity between wishful 
thinking and the actual capability of Russia. That is, working on an idea was one thing, and its 
application to real policy was another‖ (Shin 2007, p.8). This limitation forced Russia‘s foreign 
policy to consider another readjustment.  
Civilisationist/ Tradition-oriented Nationalism/ Conservative approach understands 
Russia in ethno-national terms. According to Mankoff, Russia after 1991 was not a tabula rasa, 
and ideological leftovers from soviet times remained present (Mankoff 2009). A civilisationist 
foreign policy implies an alliance with any country that would balance against the imperialist 
United States (Hopf 2016). This view sees Russia‘s national interest is almost by definition, anti-
Western (Tsygankov 2016). For them military power is more important than economic power as 
it is more important for the great power status in terms of hard power. Given its ethno-national 
Russian identity, it understood the Near Abroad (millions of ethnic Russians live there), as a 
critical national interest, important for reunification of ethnic Russians with their Homeland 
(Hopf 2016). Furthermore they see a moral obligation to support and defend brethren Russkie, 
even beyond Russia‘s borders (Teper 2016). Russian values such as history, language, and the 
Orthodox faith are fundamentally different from those of the West, therefore one of 
civilisationist visions is that Russia should be a geopolitically and culturally distinct entity with a 
mission to stabilize relations between East and West (Laruelle 2015).  
 
Russia’s visions of national interests argued by Shin, Hopf and Tsygankov 
 
Westernism/West-oriented 
Liberalism/ Liberal tradition 
1. Integration with Western economic and security 
institutions;   
2. Economic development and modernisation prevail 
over great power status seeking; 
3. Interests in near abroad negligible; 
 
Statism/ Pragmatic Statism/ 
 
1. Restoration of great power status through  both 
economic development and military modernization; 
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Centrist approach 2. Reintegration with post Soviet space; 
3. Cooperation with West based on mutual respect of 
great power status 
 
Civilisationist/Tradition-
oriented/Conservative approach 
Hard-line approach 
 
 
Civilisationist soft-line approach 
 
1. Focus on military modernisation in order to achieve 
great power status 
2. Promotion of Russian values which are 
fundamentally different from those of the West 
3. Restoring Russian empire 
 
1. Great power status 
2. Russia as geopolitically and culturally distinct 
entity with a mission to stabilize relations between 
East and West 
 
Table 1:  Russia‘s visions of national interests argued by Shin, Hopf and Tsygankov 
 
Theory on identity and national interests 
 
Following Teper‘s argument, the way in which the annexation of Crimea influenced 
Russian national interests is a particularly interesting case for analysis because the change of 
borders requires explanation and legitimization for this particular move. In this process interests 
and identities are either reasserted or reformulated and reconfigured  (Teper 2016). As mentioned 
before, realism cannot explain assertiveness in foreign policy which is not supported by 
economic improvement. Additionally it does not pay much attention to the change of 
explanations and does not provide accounts for cooperation between countries when they have 
competing interests. For example even though Russian ties with the West declined due to an 
unprecedented low level, Russia still produces discourses on cooperation based on equal respect, 
especially in the area of economy and in solving major political issues such as Iranian nuclear 
deal.  
Rejecting the rationalist assumptions of realism and liberalism and their neo variants, 
constructivists have introduced a sociological perspective on world politics, emphasizing the 
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importance of normative, as well as material structures, role of ideas and identity in the 
constitution of interests and the mutual constitution of agents and structures (Wendt 1994a; Price 
& Reus Smit 1998; Guzzini 2007; Hopf 2002; Zehfuss 2004; Adler 1997). Assuming that 
national interests are exogenously given and exist objectively such as realism and liberalism 
claim, can lead to many shortcomings in the analysis. Specifically, they neglect important 
questions like who, why and how produces national interests (Weldes 2011).   
Constructivist approaches are useful especially to understand Russian self and the 
concept of identity however conventional constructivism has a constraint because it follows the 
causal logic behind identity and interests. Additionally, as conventional constructivism follows 
the line of division between material and ideational realities, their argument would probably go 
into direction that material factors such as geopolitical balancing prompt changes into Russia‘s 
interests and identity surrounding the Ukraine crisis. According to Waever, conventional 
constructivism offers little advice on how to examine how unit or nation creates its own 
rationales behind identity and foreign policy (Wæver 2002). Therefore beside conventional 
constructivism I find important to include in the analysis poststructuralist understanding of 
interests and identity. Following Hansen‘s argument there are no objective identities located in 
some extra-discursive realm. Representations of identity are the precondition for interests and 
policy and furthermore they are produced or reproduced through articulations of policies and 
interests (Hansen 2006b).  
Therefore the usefulness of the poststructuralist approach in Russian national interest 
(RNI) formation analysis lies in the understanding that meanings and knowledge are discursively 
constructed. Language is a very important element in this process and it can help us discover the 
forces behind RNI formation. I argue that national interests are discursively framed and 
constructed in the language used by government officials in charge for foreign policy. Using 
language is the process of making sense of certain choices and ―speaking is doing is knowing‖ 
(Kowert 1998, p.104). 
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Figure 1: Discourses, interests and identity 
 
Concepts of identify and national interest within constructivist and poststructuralist 
framework will be discussed further. 
 
 
Constructing identity 
 
The central concept of construcitivism is the concept of identity. Simply because before 
nations figure out how to defend their interests in the most appropriate manner, they first seek to 
understand themselves and their role in international society (Tsygankov 2010). Since Kant and 
Hegel, identity formation has been understood as a separation and distinction from others 
(Lebow 2016b). The identities of Self and the Other are mutually necessary for an actor to 
understand the interests and environment. Additionally, as Clunan argues national identity is an 
interactive product of the self and its context and as such it can be changed and reproduced 
(Clunan 2009). Furthermore Hopf claims that identity is a cognitive device which can help 
human brains process large amount of information (Hopf 2002).   
There are a number of established definitions of identity but there is no singularly-
accepted definition. However, it is easy to recognize main functions of this concept which are 
helpful for social analysis. The first very important function of the identity is that it is able to tell 
you and others who you are and who others are. Second, identities can imply a particular set of 
interests or preferences in foreign policy. Finally, for Ted Hopf a world without identities would 
          IDENTITY 
Discourses (re)produced in the language of 
foreign policy officials 
       INTERESTS 
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be one of "chaos, a world of pervasive and irremediable uncertainty, a world much more 
dangerous than anarchy" (Hopf 1998, p.175).  
 On the other hand some scholars criticize the very nature of the concept of identity and 
see it as problematic. Identity research still lacks agreed definition on what scholars mean and do 
not mean when using this concept. Identity has been criticized as a catch-all term, used to explain 
different conducts in foreign policy, but it still does not provide suggestions that states with 
particular types of identities will act in particular ways (Finnemore & Sikkink 2001).  Especially 
problematic for some scholars is not that a identity as a concept is used, but how it is used as the 
identity is too ambiguous to serve well the demands of social analysis (Brubaker & Cooper 
2000). Therefore I find important to discuss this concept and its relations with foreign policy and 
interests. 
There is a complex relationship between identity and foreign policy. This complexity is 
often reflected in tensions in the formulation of collective identities because a state identity 
construction takes place at multiple levels. Lebow argues that there is international level where 
other states take part in this process. Then there is a state level where officials are in charge, but 
there is also a sub-state level with diverse actors (Lebow 2016a). For example bodies of the 
Russian government such as the President and its administration, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Ministry of Defence, other executive agencies, and the Parliament all compete for influence over 
various aspects of policy toward certain Others like European Union, China and the United 
States. Simultaneously, local and regional governments lead policies according to their interests 
hoping to create relationships with Europe or Asia independently from Moscow. Business 
lobbies, companies, interest groups, and different nongovernmental organizations also try to 
weigh in as they can. Everyday there are thousands of choices through Russian society which 
contribute to the collective identity choice (Hopf 2008).  For the purpose of this research, only 
choices made by foreign policy officials such as the President and his administration, the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Prime Minister in shaping and reshaping Russian identity 
will be analyzed. 
When analysing identity another distinction should be noted. For individuals, the process 
of identity and interest construction is a social and personal process; however it is not the same 
for states. In the latter case the process is political. Mainly because states do not have reflexive 
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self, and therefore they cannot accept or reject attributions made by others. Only their leaders 
and citizens can (Lebow 2016b). States are not passive actors as officials everywhere produce or 
encourage the narratives that support interests according to  their political goals (Lebow 2016a). 
National leaders exercise some choice regarding state identifications, but this does not make 
states persons, and it is important to acknowledge this difference and its consequences. However, 
what is the same when it comes to individual and state identity is that they can only be 
understood relationally. We cannot know what an identity is without relating it to another. For 
example, being a great power is meaningless unless we can create a non-great power identity 
(Hopf 2002). 
Early constructivist, Alexander Wendt claims that there are two types of identity. First 
one is corporate identity which has a singular quality and constitutes actor individuality. The 
second type is social identity which represents the sets of meanings that an actor attributes to 
itself while taking the perspective of other (Wendt 1994b). Wendt argued that the corporate 
identity can exist without the need to relate it to other and it generates four basic interests of a 
state
4
 (Wendt 1994b, p.385). Constructivism argued by Wendt is often referred to as systematic 
as it focuses on interaction between states in the international system and ignores non-systemic 
sources of state identity such as domestic political culture (Karacasulu & Uzgören 2007). 
Wendt has convincingly argued that the anarchy is what states make out of it, and 
therefore interests are not produced exogenously in the anarchic system. He made important 
steps in constructivist identity analysis by introducing re-conceptualization through the important 
process of meaning creation and inter-subjectivity (Wendt 1999). Wendt developed assumptions 
on the dual nature of identity, identity formation from the perspective of the system, prevalence 
of ideational factors over material, and linear causality of identity, interests and foreign policy, 
which served as a foundation of research for many constructivists after him.  
For example authors like Martha Finnemore focus on international society and how it 
shapes state‘s identities and interests. Finnemore attempts to show that socialization at the 
international level through organizations such as World Bank and the Red Cross can change state 
preferences from traditionally defined interests (Finnemore 1996). As these accounts focus on 
                                                          
4
 Physical security, ontological security, development and recognition 
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international influences, Hopf has tried to fill in the research gap and he addressed the influence 
of internal societal dimension on identity. For example he established ―common sense 
constructivism‖ by combining social theory of constructivism with theories of hegemony. He 
came to the conclusion that common sense of the masses in various ways affects the political 
calculations of elites and therefore affects state‘s policy outcomes (Hopf 2013). Clunan criticized 
Wend‘s and Hopf‘s approaches arguing that they overly focus on international or structural 
accounts of how identity shapes behaviour without addressing how particular identities come to 
dominate at different points in time and how they change (Clunan 2009, pp.6–7). That is why she 
proposed to incorporate historical memory, psychological, and cultural aspects to identity 
analysis. She claims identity and interest formation is a process which should be analyzed, it is 
not an outcome that can be explained by the structures an actor faces (Clunan 2009). However 
Clunan also follows the causality logic as she argues that political elites will rationally create 
collective identity which will shape national interests, based on psychological need for collective 
self-esteem. 
Each of the scholars that I mentioned above has tried to improve constructivist accounts 
in foreign policy and to enhance explanations on complex relations between interests and 
identity. But by arguing causal logic behind identity and interests these scholars put greater 
emphasis on the former and therefore seem to neglect the possibility that interests can also 
influence identities. As I seek to improve understanding of national interests formation, I find 
useful to incorporate poststructuralist accounts of interests and identity. In that manner, I find 
Hansen‘s approach particularly useful. She claims that various foreign policies are legitimized in 
the national interest framework through reference to identities. Additionally, identities are 
produced and reproduced through foreign policy formulations. Identities are not objective 
accounts as they are fluid, relational, negotiated and reshaped constantly. Therefore identity and 
policy are constituted through a process of narrative adjustment and they have constitutive, rather 
than causal, relationship (Hansen 2006). The conceptualization of identity as discursive, 
relational, and social suggests that foreign policy discourse always articulates a Self and a series 
of Others which can take different degrees of Otherness, ranging from crucial difference to less 
than fundamental difference between Self and Other (Hansen 2006, p.6). 
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The ongoing debate on Russian identity tries to frame Russia as European or  Eurasian, 
but there are also those who claim that Russia instead has its own unique combination of 
characteristics (Hopf 2008). Russian interference in Ukraine has changed policies in various 
directions, and Lo, for example, suggests that developments around the Ukraine crisis have 
confirmed Russian interests in Asian strategy. Through Asian strategy Russia can counterbalance 
the United States and can establish itself as a reliable alternative to the Western led governance. 
It can also reinforce Russia as an independent center of power (Lo 2015).  Therefore in order to 
analyse the change of interests, policies and possibly identity around Ukraine crisis, I find useful 
to include Weaver‘s theory on discursive structure.  In his theory he explained that the 
relationship between identities and discourse. Like Hansen, he follows a poststructuralist 
approach and claims  that interests cannot be presented by political actors outside of the 
discursive structure, and an interest-based argument is always made on the basis of a particular 
distribution of layered identities (Wæver 2002, p.30). For Waever, discussing identity changes is 
not yes or no question, it is only a question of how much pressure is necessary, what degree of 
political cost can be tolerated in breaking a certain identity code (Wæver 2002).  
I argue that in Russian foreign policy, the Ukraine crisis presented the pressure which 
caused a rupture in the Russian European identity code. The main reasons behind this are the 
unsettled identity structures towards West. In the post-Soviet Era Russia and had uneasy 
relationship with Europe and therefore difficulties with incorporating European identity. For 
example, being naturally European implies a Russia that is already confident that it is as 
European as France or Germany, and that Russia need not be tutored as to what constitutes 
European identity which currently is not a case (Hopf 2008). 
Finally, in order to theoretically frame certain Russia‘s preferences, I will also 
incorporate Urrestarazu‘s5 three dimensional model of identity - narrative, performative and 
emotional. Narrative dimension is constructed socially through particular country‘s (Russia in 
this case) historical development and represents the construction of self through relations with 
others. The second is performative dimension which represents a synthesization of several 
(potentially different) narratives into one meaningful Self, constituted in a specific situation in 
                                                          
5
 According to Urrestarazu the concept of identity is ―extremely complex, because it comprises individual and 
collective, historical and cultural dimensions at the same time, all directed towards the formulation of policies vis-á-
vis the external realm of an actor‖ (Urrestarazu 2015, p.136). 
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which foreign policy is put into practice (Urrestarazu 2015, p.137).  This dimension will help us 
understand Russian contested identities and contested interests that simultaneously exist in 
Russian foreign policy. Finally, emotional dimension implies close connection between identity 
and self-esteem because much of international relations can be characterized as a struggle not 
only for power, but for high-status roles and privileges (Lebow 2016b). This dimension is useful 
for understanding the relevance of concepts such as glory, trust, hate and other emotion led 
concepts in foreign policy (Urrestarazu 2015, p.138). Additionally, citizens feel good about 
themselves when they belong to a nationality or a state they consider superior. They take 
vicarious pride in the accomplishments of their state. The glorious past and equally glorious 
future are often referenced in Russian official discourse. As Leboow argues, in order to 
legitimize the importance in international system and to gain recognition from other actors, 
leaders often claim distinctiveness and superiority and Russia is no exception (Lebow 2016b). 
Additionally, emotional dimension is very present in Russian foreign policy towards near abroad.  
 
 
Constructing national interests 
 
The concept of the national interest has long been central to theories of international 
politics due to its role in the explanation of state action. However, many scholars doubt its 
analytical usefulness. For some scholars the concept of national interest remains a very 
problematic and contested idea with wide a range of meanings. For example, according to Joseph 
Nye ―national interest is a slippery concept, used to describe as well as prescribe foreign 
policy―(Nye 1999). Therefore there is a significant debate about it within the IR discipline and 
some scholars have even regretted the importance of the idea of a national interest today. On the 
other side of this dispute are those who insist that the notion of the national interest should 
remain central to explanations of state action and thus of international politics. Among the 
loudest proponents of national interest are certainly realists like Morghenthau who argued that 
national interest defined in terms of power is the main guide for foreign policies that helps them 
find the way through the landscape of international politics (Morgenthau 1948). I understand the 
criticism of the concept and therefore share the opinion that its analytical usefulness is rather 
limited if it is not understood as a social construction. 
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Alexander Wendt defines the national interest as the objective interests of state society 
complexes, consisting of four needs: physical survival, autonomy, economic well-being, and 
collective self-esteem
6
 (Wendt 1999, p.198). He built his definition on George and Keohane‘s 
formulation that national interests are ―life, liberty, and property‖.  According to Wend, if a state 
wants to achieve security it has to meet all four objectives. 
On the other hand, Clunan argues that national interests are built on two pillars, political 
purpose and international status. Political purpose is based on the ideas about which principles 
and values symbols characterize the country but also what values and principles should govern 
relations between countries. For example the Russian Federation may have a political purpose of 
―becoming a Western country‖ or ―protecting all Slavs‖ or ―restoring the Soviet empire‖ (Clunan 
2009, p.31). The second pillar related to international status which includes ranking and position 
of a country into imagined international hierarchy of political, economic and military power. 
Countries can rank differently like developed countries, third world countries, industrialized 
countries etc. Additionally ranking refers to super, great, medium, or small power along global or 
regional lines. The second pillar is important for my analysis as it purpose is to indicate if a 
country is a status-seeker or a status-maintainer (Clunan 2009). For example it seems that the 
annexation of Crimea represented an important milestone in Russian foreign policy as after the 
events in 2014 Russian officials perceive that Russia went from a position of a great power status 
seeker to great power status maintainer. 
As I maintain that national interests cannot be assumed apriori and have to be discovered 
empirically, I find useful to incorporate a view argued by Jutta Weldes into my analysis. Weldes 
re-examined national interests in a case study of the Cuban Missile crisis. She argues that 
national interests are important in international politics firstly because they help policy makers 
understand goals which the state pursues, and secondly they are a tool through which 
legitimization and support for foreign policy actions is generated (Weldes 2011). Weldes does 
not see interests as previously established objectives like Wendt. Rather she explains that 
                                                          
6
 What counts as survival varies historically and it is not just the preservation of existing territory. For example 
according to Wendt decision to agree on dissolution of Soviet Union counts as a survival for Russia, as Russia was 
the core of the state and later successor. What counts as autonomy is also case dependent but in short autonomy is 
the liberty of a state or organization to meet internal demands or respond to contingencies in the environment. 
Economic well being is usually connected with economic growth and finally, collective self-esteem refers to a 
group's need to feel good about itself, for respect or status (Wendt 1999, p.236). 
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constructing national interests is done through the process of interpretation and communication 
by the state officials. She also provides a useful framework which will help us to answer the 
following questions: who, why and how produces national interests in the Russian Federation. 
There is variation of state institutions involved in national interest formation across different 
states, but according to Weldes it is safe to say that national interest is produced primarily, 
although not exclusively, by foreign policy decision-makers (Weldes 2011).  
The answer to the question why states produce national interests is related to the fact that 
in order for a state to act it has to comprehend its environment and should have some 
specification of its goals. National interests will enable the state to make a decision on how to act 
in a particular situation. Leaders construct the national interests and conduct foreign policy based 
upon their assessment of other states‘ intentions in the environment (Weldes 2011). 
Representations make clear to state officials who and what they are, who and what their enemies 
are, and how they are threatened by them. 
Finally, when it comes to how national interests are produced, Weldes claims that they 
are contracted through the process of articulation and interpellation.   The term articulation refers 
to the process of giving meaning out of cultural materials. Meaning is created by establishing 
chains of connotations among different linguistic elements which make sense within a particular 
society (Weldes 2011, p.190). For example in representations of post Cold War Russian foreign 
policy, for instance, the object ―Western institutions‖ was often articulated to, and hence came to 
connote, ―expansion‖ and ―potential aggression‖. As a result, when the term Western institution 
like NATO or the European Union has been used, it simultaneously carries with it (among other 
characteristics) the meanings of expansion and potential aggression. This is one part of a 
complex process of constructing national interests. 
The other part of this constructive process involves the interpellation. This concept was 
introduced by French philosopher Louis Althusser. In short it represents a process which can 
explain the way in which cultural ideas have an effect on individuals‘ lives so much that they 
start to believe that they are their own (Althusser 1971). For Weldes interpellation means that 
specific identities are created through the process of internationalization of culture‘s values. In 
the language of the national interest, the Russian Federation for example, not only as a subject, 
but as a subject which represents an imagined national community (Weldes 2011). For instance, 
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claims about the Russian national interest during Putin‘s third term made sense to most Russians 
as they are for interpellated into different but familiar subject-positions. Following Weldes‘ 
example, Russians are hailed into the position of the Russia, into the imagined national 
community of Russianness. In addition, they are simultaneously hailed into other familiar 
positions, including such comfortable identities as the ―justice loving country‖ which opposes 
―Western aggressions‖, or the ―concerned Russian patriot‖ who believes that ―we‖ should protect 
―Russian speakers abroad.‖ Within Russian foreign policy, process of interpellation is largely 
used to construct the notion of the Russian world.  
 
 
Poststructuralist Methodological Approach 
 
The goal of the methodology component is to establish a proper research design to 
achieve the aim of the research which is to unpack the meanings behind discourses on Russian 
national interests during Putin‘s third term. And also to answer the research question How has 
the Crimean crisis changed Russian national interests formation and a sub question How 
coherent are discourses on national interests represented by the Russian officials. 
As a research strategy this thesis is built around an interpretative single case study of 
Russian national interest formation. Case studies‘ purpose is to provide a comprehensive 
description and analysis of a single object of study in a specific context (Odell 2001). Many 
criticize single case studies under the assumption that they do not provide adequate comparison 
and accordingly cannot be used in generalizations (Landman 2008). However, the case chosen 
for study will provide comparison in contextual description and even though the thesis is built on 
single case study research, it is chosen to contribute larger sets of questions in international 
relations discipline, especially related to national interest formation. 
Unlike positivist ontological and epistemological approaches which claim that reality is 
objective, independent from observer and predictable (Gerring & Thomas 2005), for the purpose 
of my research, I decided to employ interpretative ontology and epistemology. A research 
starting from an interpretative position is based on the principle that there are many, equally 
valid, time and context dependent interpretations of reality (Biggam 2011). Following Fierke‘s 
argument most objects of international relations, unlike rocks or trees, exist only as a human 
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creation in a cultural, historical, and political context of meaning. That is why for example 
human rights, threats or national interests are rather social facts, than material ones, that exist 
only because of the meaning and value attributed to them (Fierke 2013). Additionally, research 
based on interpretative ontology and epistemology sees a language as a very significant tool in 
explaining reality. Language is not a transparent and objective means able to provide true 
meaning like positivists see it. On the contrary, language is as social practice as it is not an 
external part of society and it is socially conditioned by other (non-linguistic) parts of society 
(Fairclough 1989). 
 
 
Research Design 
 The main method of research is discourse analysis together with text analysis (as an 
essential part of discourse analysis). According to Fairclough, discourse analysis is not only the 
linguistic analysis of texts: The term discourse signals the particular view of language in use as 
an element of social life which is closely interconnected with other elements concerned with the 
relationship between language and other elements and aspects of social life, and its approach to 
the linguistic analysis of texts is always oriented to the social character of texts (Fairclough 2003, 
p.3). Fairclough‘s discourse analysis takes a more critical approach because it includes 
representations of how things are and have been, as well as imaginaries and representations of 
how things might, could or should be  (Fairclough 2003). However, even though this research 
emphasizes the linguistic construction of reality, it takes the view that the productive nature of 
language does not depend on hidden intentions or motivations of social actors (Doty 2011). 
Discourse analysis works on public texts and does not try to get to the thoughts or motives of the 
actors or to their secret plans. According to Waever for the sake of argument clarity public and 
open sources should be used for what they are, not as indicator of potentially something else  
(Wæver 2002). 
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Data collection and data analysis 
 
 The first criteria in data collection are the time frame under the study. However due to a 
large amount of materials I also used codes to identify relevant texts for analysis. These codes 
were national interests, Russian world, polycentric, Crimea, values, identity, world order, West, 
goals/aims, foreign policy. 
For discourses produced by Putin I used the official kremlin.ru website. I was guided by 
codes, but also looked into annual addresses of the president to the Federal Assembly because in 
these addresses the president outlines priority targets for national political and economic 
development. I also looked into website section statements on the major issues, transcripts of 
media conferences and press releases. I also use the president‘s speeches at the Valdai 
Discussion Club for example, as this forum is seen as an important platform where Russian 
officials have the opportunity to engage with domestic and international academics in debates 
about  the most important trends and events in the world. Majority of material is taken from the 
time under study - during Vladimir Putin‘s third term. However research will also relay on few 
older sources that traces the genealogy of the dominant representations such as articles written in 
2012 by Vladimir Putin while he was prime minister as they still represent his views on 
important issues. These are Russia and the changing world, Being strong: National security 
guarantees for Russia, Democracy and the quality of government, Russia: The Ethnicity Issue, 
Russia muscles up – the challenges we must rise to face. 
The second important source is the Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, especially 
Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov‘s remarks and answers to media questions and interviews of 
Minister Lavrov to Bloomberg, Russia Today, Washington Post etc. There are also ten articles 
written by Sergey Lavrov and published on Russia in the Global Affairs website which will be 
used as primary data. Selection of text is as well guided by codes with the primary focus on 
interviews, statements and articles. 
The third important source of data is the Russian government website. I use Government 
reports on its performance, then transcripts from interviews like conversations of Dmitry 
Medvedev with five television channel and also transcripts of meetings of the CIS Council of 
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Heads of Government, meetings of the Eurasian Intergovernmental Council and meeting of the 
SCO Council of Heads of Government. Analysis will also refer to Dmitry Medvedev‘s articles 
such as Russia and Ukraine: Living by new rules, Go Russia!, New dynamics in Russia‘s 
socioeconomic development,  The new reality: Russia and global challenges, The time of simple 
solutions is past. For Medvedev‘s discourses I was also primarily guided by codes found in his 
interviews and statements. 
The fourth source of data are official foreign policy documents such as Foreign Policy 
Strategies from 2013 and 2016; National Security Strategies from 2008 and 2015; Russian 
Military doctrines from 2010 and 2014. 
Hansen (2006) explained four main steps for research design based on discourse analysis. 
The first step is choice of Selves—or how many states, nations, or other foreign policy subjects 
one wishes to examine. In my case, that is the single Russian self. Hansen suggests that the Self 
is constituted through the delineation of Others, and the Other can be articulated as superior, 
inferior, or equal (Hansen 2006b, p.68). In the literature on Russian identity, the West is 
perceived as the most significant Other. However, after the annexation of Crimea, the Russian 
self is situated within a more complicated set of identities, especially a growing presence of 
Eurasian orientation. 
 The second important step is a decision on inter-textual model. Hansen makes difference 
between official discourse, wider political debate and academic discourse. For the purpose of this 
research and due to its scope only official discourse will be examined. That means that research 
will be directly based on official foreign policy discourse and the focus will be on political 
leaders who have the authority to pursue and sanction different foreign policies (Hansen 2006b). 
For my analysis I identified speeches, interviews and articles of the main decision makers on 
foreign policy in Russia. These are president Vladimir Putin, prime minister Dmitri Medvedev 
and Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov. 
 Regarding the timeline I use a shorter timeframe from 2012-2017, that is from the 
beginning of Vladimir Putin's third presidential term. I find that a shorter time frame will give 
me the possibility to discuss discourses on Russian national interest formation and provide more 
in-depth analysis. The crucial moment around which will be used as a parameter if and what kind 
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of change has happened in national interest formation will be Crimean crisis. This event is 
significant as it has challenged Russian relations with near abroad, especially Ukraine, relations 
with West declined to the lowest level after the end of Cold War and Russia started seeking 
comfort Eastwards. 
Finally, I will also use Waever‘s discursive layered framework (Wæver 2002). His 
framework is useful to examine discourses on Russian identity and Russia‘s relational position 
towards West. Additionally, this framework helps to understand if policies (third layer) 
undertaken by Russian government since 2012 have affected Russia‘s interests and identity. The 
first layer he calls the basic conceptual constellation of state and nation and as he suggested I 
will trace Russia‘s discursive construction of self. The first layer is the core layer focused on 
country‘s identity and it is the most difficult to change. The second layer is the relational position 
of the state/nation and I will look into Russian relational position towards West (as the most 
Significant Others in Russian case). Finally the third layer are concrete Russian policies 
undertaken under the third presidential term of Vladimir Putin. Third layer therefore represents 
operationalisation of interests and it is a surface level where small changes can be made without 
affecting second layer. A radical policy change would be able to influence changes in the second 
layer. And only the most radical policy changes will be able to affect the core layer but radically 
different core layer would be in most cases very hazardous (Wæver 2002).  
As Waever addressed only the change towards one Other, I find that it is important to 
address the possibility of change in various directions, or to be more precise, if the interests and 
identity change towards one Other can constitute interest/identity change toward another Other. 
With this argument I will examine if the changes in relations with the West have prompted the 
changes in Russia‘s relations with other actors in international community. 
 
Limitations and potential problems 
This is a language dependent study but my Russian language skills are rather limited. 
Therefore I try to overcome this limitation by using official translations of speeches and 
interviews published on official websites. A further limitation is also the fact that I will be 
analysing only official discourses, setting aside wider political debate and academic discourses 
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on national interests. But I find my choice appropriate due to the scope of this research and the 
fact that production of national interests is done, not exclusively but primarily by officials in 
charge of foreign policy. The research is inevitably selective because, as in any analysis, the 
author chooses to ask certain questions about social events and texts, and not other possible 
questions. Secondly, generalisation from a single case study will always be limited since a 
particular country is bounded by its special characteristics (Landman 2008). However, I find that 
understanding a particular country‘s set of choices can still enrich the existing debates on 
national interests in international relations. Finally, as most of the empirical material comes from 
the websites I was not able to provide page number for direct quotations. 
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RUSSIA HAS REDEFINED NATIONAL INTERESTS 
 
 
This analytical chapter is structured around Wendt‘s argument that to certain extent some 
state identities and interests stem primarily from relations to domestic society while others come 
from international society (Wendt 1994b). Contents of state‘s interests and identities get 
redefined by the changing international and domestic circumstances. In turn these changes reflect 
into identity self-conceptions and they can modify national interests and their hierarchy. For 
example, like Omelicheva argues in recent years, beside geopolitical elements of Russian foreign 
policy, very important place take cultural and civilizational elements. They became crucial for 
Russia‘s conception of the Self and its perception of the world (Omelicheva 2016).  
The first part of this analytical chapter will analyse the change of interests caused by 
domestic circumstances especially in terms of ideas about national sovereignty as well as in 
defining values, and the second part will be devoted to the analysis of changing international 
circumstances in terms of Russia‘s position in the international system and international political 
orientation in terms of identity.  
Discussion on identity will follow Urrestarazu‘s argument on multidimensional aspects of 
identity. Narrative dimension is incorporated through discursive construction referring to culture 
and history. This dimension is important for framing Russia‘s position in the world. Performative 
dimension regards the situational character of identity and helps mapping competing identity 
discourses like belonging to Europe, or building own civilizational alternative, or even the turn to 
East. Finally, emotional dimension is incorporated through the discourses on the need for 
respect, trust, and family related metaphors regarding near abroad courtiers. 
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 Discussion on interests will follow Weldes‘ steps on representation, articulation and 
interpellation. I will discuss how Russia represents new meanings on concepts such as national 
sovereignty and territorial integrity, how it attributed new meanings to certain values, and how it 
sees the international system and its place in it. Articulation on the other hand will help me 
elaborate changes in the way how Russia perceives its national interests. Finally interpellation is 
particularly important for understanding the Russian World as Russia is promoting certain values 
which tries to incorporate into familiar position of Russianness. After all Russia is a subject 
which represents an imagined national community and during Putin‘s third term Russia has 
added additional efforts to promote distinctive values and gain support from people (primarily 
but not exclusively Russians) that live in (near) abroad. 
 
 
Changing domestic circumstances  
 
When examining the national interests of a country, I find that initial contextual 
understanding can be gained from official documents like Foreign policy concepts, National 
security strategies and Military doctrines. Usually these documents provide very abstract 
definitions of national interests. For example according to the National security strategy the 
Russian Federation's national interests are ―objectively significant requirements of the individual, 
society, and the state‖ (National Security Strategy 2015). However, by adding insights from 
other documents and speeches done by high level officials, we can identify the main discourses 
around which national interests are built.  
Traditional foreign policy interests mentioned across all strategic documents are ensuring 
national security and creating favourable external conditions for economic growth. However, 
what stands out most loudly in the Foreign policy concept from 2016 is the status projection: 
―With a view to upholding the national interests of the Russian Federation, foreign policy 
activities shall be aimed to consolidate the Russian Federation‘s position as a centre of influence 
in today‘s world‖ (Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation 2016). Therefore I argue 
that behind Russian international conducts, whether that is continuous support for the Syrian 
government, joint military exercises with Belarus, or joint naval exercises with China, there is an 
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ultimate aim of ensuring a place in hierarchy of power where important international decisions 
are made.  
Additionally, I would argue that one of the first proofs that changes occurred in the way 
how Russia conceptualise its national interests and foreign policy is the fact that not long after 
the interference in Ukraine and the beginning of the crisis in relations with the West, Russia 
adopted new Military doctrine in 2014. The following year a new National security strategy was 
signed, and finally, in 2016 new Foreign policy concept was adopted. Previous versions of 
Military doctrines came into force in 2010 and 2000. Security strategies were previously adopted 
in 2009 and 2000, and finally, foreign policy concepts were adopted in 2013 and 2008. Even 
though these kind of documents contain generic strategic and administrative language 
(Monaghan 2013), they also provide to certain extent the understanding of how Russia sees its 
position in international system, how it sees international environment and  how it will seek to 
act.  
 
 
Changed understanding of national sovereignty   
 
Clunan argued that while many in the West have come to see the post–Cold War world as 
a postmodern future of softened sovereignty due to the process of globalisation, Russian elites 
have not changed their views on political space. She wrote that most of the Russian elites 
perceive international relations through a nineteenth-century lens of sovereign states (Clunan 
2009). However, I would argue that Russia has changed its perceptions on the concept of 
national sovereignty. 
Discourses on national sovereignty can be traced in the official documents. I argue that it 
is not a coincidence that the first document that was replaced after the events in 2014 was a 
Military doctrine. Even though the document contains only few individual changes compared to 
its predecessor (The Military Doctrine 2010), they are still significant as they are included to 
send a message to Russia‘s opponents, allies and others. Russia sees the world as a more 
dangerous place then in 2010 however the point that the Russian Federation has the legitimate 
right to use force to repel aggression against itself or against its allies (therefore in defensive 
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purposes) is not new. The section Employment of the Armed Forces, other troops and bodies, 
and their main tasks in peacetime under the conditions of an imminent threat of aggression and 
in wartime clearly states that the Russian Federation has the legitimate right to employ the 
Armed Forces and other troops to fight the aggression but also to  use these entities for 
protection of the Russian citizens abroad with respect for international law and international 
treaties of the Russian Federation (The Military Doctrine 2014). This narrative is followed in the 
2016 Foreign Policy Concept and in 2015 Security Strategy. For example, according to the 
National Security Strategy utilization of military force to protect national interests is possible in 
the cases where non violent measures are ineffective (National Security Strategy 2015). 
Therefore this trend reflects the growing intention to use forceful means to ensure what is 
perceived to be Russian national interests. 
However the rhetoric before the Ukraine crisis was significantly different and Russia was 
interested to reduce the role of force in the international system while improving strategic and 
regional stability (Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation 2013) For example, 
Putin in 2012 claimed that the basic foundational principles for any civilization are 
―unacceptability of excessive use of force, and the unconditional observance of the basic 
standards of international law‖ (Putin 2012e). Additionally, in his interview for TV channel 
Russia today in late 2013 Lavrov argued that Russian foreign policy is primarily guided by the 
Concept of Foreign Policy. The main principles for Russian conduct internationally were 
pragmatism, aspiration to equal partnerships, and, most importantly, the principle to ―defend 
national interests consistently and firmly, without being involved into any confrontation‖. 
Furthermore, Russia does not seek domination and does not pretend to any ―superposition‖. On 
the contrary, Russia aims to be a leader in the field of international law and a defender of the 
principles listed in the United Nations Charter (Lavrov 2013f).  
Based on strategic documents, I would argue that Russia has become a state which 
perceives that it has a lot to defend against and therefore more assertive rhetoric is being 
employed. The official narrative of increasingly dangerous international society is present in 
Military doctrine, Security strategy and Foreign policy concept and in all three documents 
significant part is devoted to threats. Perceived threats are global competition, tension, rivalry for 
resources and values and stage-by-stage redistribution of influence in favour of new centres of 
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economic growth. I argue that because Russia has changed the way in which it perceives its 
place in international system alongside with changes on the discourses of the concept on national 
sovereignty, goals mentioned in strategic documents before 2014 became practically 
unattainable. 
For example, when it comes to goals mentioned in the Foreign Policy Concept from 
2013, I would argue that Russia‘s position abroad (or at least in the West)  can hardly be referred 
to as ―high standing‖ (Pew Research Center 2014; BBC World Service Poll 2014). Additionally, 
sanctions affected negatively ―steady and dynamic growth of the Russian economy‖ and 
therefore the quality of life continues to decrease. Until 2014 Russia followed one policy line and 
was widely promoting principles of respect for sovereignty and non-interference in the domestic 
affairs of other states. But after the annexation of Crimea I find very difficult for Russia to play 
the role of defender of UN Charter‘s basic principles. With support for militant groups in Eastern 
Ukraine Russia has challenged the principle of non interference and with the annexation of 
Crimea Russia gave priority to the principle of self-determination over sovereignty and territorial 
integrity. In the concept it is clearly stated:  
―Arbitrary and politically motivated interpretation of fundamental international legal 
norms and principles such as non-use of force or threat of force, peaceful settlement of 
international disputes, respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity of states, right of 
peoples to self-determination, in favour of certain countries pose particular danger to 
international peace, law and order‖ (Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian 
Federation 2013). 
However it must be noted that this is the only paragraph in the concept which mentions 
self-determination while sovereignty was mentioned ten times and territorial integrity three 
times. Therefore it can be argued that the key principles according to Foreign policy concept 
from 2013 are sovereignty and territorial integrity.  
Furthermore, here we can trace an instance where Russian authorities are trying to tie 
their discourses and practices to discourses of international law. In this respect, there is an 
attempt to fit their meaning in with the understandings of principles of international law. For 
example, when Lavrov was asked on situation in Ukraine during Munich security conference in 
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February 2015, he claimed that according to the UN charter there are several principles but 
nation's right to self-determination is a key one. Lavrov claimed that territorial integrity and self-
determination are inviolable (Lavrov 2015). Therefore I argue that these statements showed the 
inconsistency between Russian key strategic document and the ongoing understanding of 
national interests. Furthermore the concept stated that carrying out military and other forms of 
interference under the mask of the principle of responsibility to protect is unacceptable and 
against international law (Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation 2013). 
However this exact principle was used in Ukraine which proves that Russia has changed its 
stance on this concept and decided to pursue active policy of protecting Russian compatriots and 
the Russian world. Putin seems to have forgotten that once he argued that state sovereignty is too 
easily violated in the name of the principle of human rights, especially when human rights are 
protected from the outside and on a selective basis (Putin 2012e). Finally, needless to say 
promoting good-neighbourly relations with adjoining states failed as a basic goal of foreign 
policy concept at least in regard to Ukraine and Baltic states.  
It is worth of mentioning that Ukraine was seen as a priority partner according to 
Russia‘s 2013 Foreign Policy Concept. The narrative around negotiations between the European 
Union and Ukraine was that Ukraine needs to make an independent choice which Russia will 
accept. In case that Ukraine decides to pursue the EU path, then it will lose privileges from the 
CIS free trade area and the most-favoured-nation principle will be introduced in respect of 
Ukrainian goods, ―and nothing more‖ (Lavrov 2013e). Russia anticipated that Ukraine will 
decide in favour of Russian suggestions for economic cooperation and that is why the leadership 
repeated numerous times that they will respect Ukrainian sovereign choice.  
However, in 2014 Russia decided to pursue a revisionist path and that is why the 
leadership felt the urge to replace the foreign policy concept only after three years. According to 
Lavrov, the concept was adopted in order to reflect a new stage in the history of international 
relations (Lavrov 2017d). The time of the Concept publication coincided with an annual 
presidential address to the Federal Assembly in order to ensure a higher level of importance. In 
his address Putin stated the need to continuously take care of human capital as it is the most 
important Russian resource and the achievement of major strategic goals is not possible in a 
fragmented society. Additionally, Putin repeated that Russia‘s foreign policy does not seek 
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confrontation or enemies of any kind, but he also seized the opportunity to stress that ―Russia 
will not allow their interests to be infringed upon or ignored‖ (Putin 2016e). 
Changes in discourses on sovereignty were followed by the changes of discourses on 
certain values. For example, current Russian national security strategy is intended to consolidate 
all levels of government and civil society to create favourable conditions for achieving Russian 
national interests and national priorities abroad. From a careful reading seems that a large focus 
of this strategy is on Russia‘s own development and on the role of values which are incorporated 
in the discourses on national interests. Ten times throughout the document, Russia refers to a 
vague concept ―spiritual and moral values‖ which are being reborn and present foundation of 
Russian society. Meanings included in this concept are various such as respect for family, faith 
traditions, collectivism, patriotism, fairness, and ―the continuity of our motherland‘s history‖ 
(National Security Strategy 2015). These values are described as necessary for Russian 
development. They are understood as very distinctive from the Western values where priority is 
given to material over spiritual values. Through their promotion Russia seeks to enhance national 
unity and establish the Russian world which will be discussed further. The Russian world is 
another signifier on Russia softened understanding of national sovereignty. 
 
 
The role of Russian world in national interests formation  
 
From the constructivist perspective, the Russian world is an important issue as it refers to 
national self-conceptions. As collective identity refers to an individual‘s belonging to a group 
Putin often repeats that Russia should develop with confidence and with an aim not to lose a 
sense of national unity. Russia must be a sovereign and influential country with a national 
identity based on spiritual values in order to be able to balance economic, civilisational 
and military threats. Referring to national unity Putin once said ―We must be and remain Russia" 
(Putin 2012a). For Putin this statement might be clear, however I argue that statements like this 
need to be unpacked in order to better understand how Russia perceives its nationhood and 
therefore national interests. 
37 
 
I argue that Russian world doctrine in its expansionist form has influenced significantly 
Russian foreign policy and therefore national interests during Putin‘s third term.  The Russian 
world can be defined as a geopolitical imagination of different regions with a fluid connection to 
Russia (Laurelle 2015). However the term Russian world has developed to have several 
meanings in the official discourse. Usually it includes the language as ―Russian language has 
always played an important unifying role over Russia‘s centuries of history. The Russian 
language was the main form of expression and bearer of national unity, cementing together 
the vast Russian world‖ (Putin 2013d). The Russian world provides the kind of civilisational 
identity which is based on Russian culture ―although this culture is represented not only by 
ethnic Russians, but by all the holders of this identity, regardless of their ethnicity‖ (Putin 
2012d). The Russian world stretches far beyond Russia‘s borders and is open to anyone who 
considers themselves a part of Russia and considers Russia their home (Putin 2013d). Russian 
world also plays an important role in enhancing Russia‘s position in the international system and 
it can improve Russia‘s prestige globally by spreading Russian language and Russian culture 
(Lavrov 2012). 
Feklyunina argues that the idea of the Russian world was particularly salient in Russia‘s 
official discourse before the events around Ukraine in 2014. In the period right after the 
dissolution of Soviet Union, the Russian government neglected any coordinated image-
projection efforts towards post-Soviet space. That was the period when Russia articulated a 
rather incoherent narrative of common space in near abroad without common interests, as Russia 
was primarily focused to establish good relations with the West (Feklyunina 2015). Therefore, I 
argue that maybe one of the most important causes behind triggering the redefinition of national 
interests is the lack of national idea in Russia. Soviet ideology ceased to exist, but it seems that 
Russia still has not found a common denominator for Russianness. Tsygankov for example 
argued that at a given time several ideological traditions exist, overlap, and compete for national 
influence over dominant national idea of foreign policy. For Tsygankov,  Russian idea in the 
post-Soviet context has been influenced by ideologies of Westernism, Statism, and 
Civilizationism (Tsygankov & Tsygankov 2010). Westernist idea assumes a reorientation of 
Russia‘s foreign policy toward Europe and the United States, so called pro-Western integration, 
but mostly by means of free trade and enterprise. Statist idea assumes Russia as an independent 
state that pursues great power status in order to resist the tendency of some international actors to 
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become predominant in the system. Finally, civilisationist idea is based on the assumption of 
Russia‘s cultural and civilizational distinctiveness (Tsygankov & Tsygankov 2010). 
However, in his speech at the Valdai International Discussion club Putin outlined 
Russia‘s urgent need for a united national idea as there has been no progress on questions ―about 
who we are and who we want to be‖ (Putin 2013a). According to Putin, the question of finding 
and strengthening national identity really is fundamental for Russia as it is impossible to move 
forward without spiritual, cultural and national self-determination (Putin 2013a). 
Keeping in mind that Russia did not have efficient cultural mechanisms to maintain 
influence in the neighbourhood, the Foreign policy concept from 2013 called for more efficient 
use of information, cultural and other methods for achieving Russian foreign policy goals. This 
was seen as particularly important because there is a ―risk of destructive and unlawful use of  
soft power and human rights concepts to exert political pressure on sovereign states‖ (Concept of 
the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation 2013). As Feklyunina noted this discursive change 
was followed by the rise of new public diplomacy actors and by a substantial increase in the 
funding of already existing actors such as the Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of 
Independent States, Compatriots Living Abroad and International Humanitarian Cooperation or 
and Voice of Russia (Feklyunina 2015). 
When discussing the Russian world I would argue that in the first half of Putin‘s third 
term, the agenda of reunification with historic homelands was not pursued. Instead, the Kremlin 
has tried to enhance economic and political influence over the governments in near abroad. In his 
inauguration speech Putin set as one of the main goals for Russia to become a ―leader and centre 
of gravity for whole Eurasia‖ (Putin 2012g). One of the means to achieve this position would be 
through Eurasian Economic Union (EEU). For Russian leaders the EEU has not only political 
and economic dimensions, but also has civilisationist undertaking and therefore overlaps with 
Russian world: ―The Eurasian Union is a project for maintaining the identity of nations 
in the historical Eurasian space in a new century and in a new world‖ (Putin 2013a). 
Russia was criticized that the real goal behind Eurasian integration lie in restoring 
dominance over former post soviet space (Ivanchenko 2016), but accusations are denied by 
Kremlin. For Medvedev, Eurasian integration is the long supported position from the Russian 
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side not used for promotion of Russian dominating influence, but rather as a means for a 
civilised and modern way of cohabiting with the neighbours (Medvedev 2013c). Development of 
the EEU has led Russian leadership to believe that it represents a step before harmonisation with 
European Union into common economic and humanitarian space from the Atlantic to the Pacific 
(Lavrov 2013b). In the official discourse the process of European integrations and process of 
Eurasian integrations are presented as complementary, and EEU will ensure that once when they 
are ready, EEU member states will get more equal position to negotiate integration with EU.  
As the Russian world has developed to have various meanings and it simultaneously 
overlaps with Russian led institutionalist processes, we cannot argue with certainty where the 
borders of the Russian world are. Even though in the official discourse it is not linked 
exclusively to certain ethnicity or territory it seems that Russian world mostly refers to the 
spaces made of Kievan Rus where Russian world has ―a common Dnieper baptistery‖ therefore 
follows softened sovereignty logic. In the official discourse the Kievan Rus and Holy Rus are 
often used as synonyms and represent the ancestor of Russian, Belorussian and Ukrainian 
people. For Putin a common Dnieper baptistery set foundations of common spiritual values that 
make these three nations a single people (Putin 2013b). Without a doubt, Ukraine plays an 
important role in the Russian world and once when he was asked about Ukraine, Putin said: 
―The Ukrainian people, the Ukrainian culture and the Ukrainian language have wonderful 
features that make up the identity of the Ukrainian nation. And, I, for one, really love it, 
I like all of it. It is part of our greater ―Russian, or Russian-Ukrainian, world‖(Putin 
2013a). 
Much of the discourse on the Russian world is interlinked with emotional dimension of 
Russian identity as argued by Urrestarazu (2015). Emotional and family related terminology is 
particularly present in relations with Ukraine. For instance, numerous times Russian officials 
repeated that Ukraine is a ―brotherly country‖ and Ukrainians are ―brotherly people‖. Kiev is 
perceived to be a ―mother of Russian cities‖. Even after the annexation of Crimea, Putin has kept 
maintaining that he ―does not make any distinction between Russians and Ukrainians‖ (Putin 
2015b) and as ―he has said many times already, Russians and Ukrainians are ―one people‖ (Putin 
2014a). Putin even had existential claims towards Ukraine ―Ancient Rus is our common source 
and we cannot live without each other‖ (Putin 2014a). Therefore keeping in mind how Ukraine is 
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perceived in Russian official discourse it is not a surprise that the crisis in their relations 
managed to influence significantly Russian interests and identity.  
 
 
Divided nation? 
 
In the process of unpacking the discourses behind Russian national interests formation, it 
is important to discuss what Russia perceives as threats. According to the logic of softened 
sovereignty, it is viewed that now threats to what is perceived to be a Russian world are 
simultaneously threats to Russia (Omelicheva 2016). Traditional threats such as military 
aggression against Russia have been extended, and imposing Western norms or values in Russian 
world have become perceived as a threat to Russian national interests. Or in Lavrov‘s words 
―Confrontation has been growing in the world not just as part of the natural political and 
economic competition, but also rivalry that is affecting the system of values due to our Western 
partners‘ attempts to force their views on everyone‖ (Lavrov 2017b).  
Following Omelicheva‘s (2016) argument the goal of cultural preservation from Western 
dominance has become the highest foreign policy priority of Kremlin (Omelicheva 2016). 
Additionally, Feklyunina‘s argued that for the Russian world to stay alive and continue to uphold 
its values, it is essentially important that all of its constituent parts resist any attempts to leave the 
common space. Seeking foreign policy options like becoming a member of European Union or 
NATO would symbolise a betrayal of this imagined community (Feklyunina 2015). Therefore 
the urge to establish a stable collective identity that government officials talked about before the 
annexation of Crimea is now more present in the discourses on national interests.  
The way in which Russia justified the annexation of Crimea follows Neumann‘s 
argument that conceptions of self and interests tend to mirror the practices of significant other 
over time (Neumann 1999). Exercising military might over smaller and weaker nations is 
something that Russia‘s Significant Other (West) has done in the past. That is why he compared 
the right of self-determination of Crimea with self-determination in the case of Kosovo. Rhetoric 
used variety of narratives on double standards, NATO and EU eastward expansion.  
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However, one of the loudest discourses was there was also an argument of Russia as 
divided nation (Laruelle 2015). The statement that the ―Russian nation became one 
of the biggest, if not the biggest ethnic group in the world to be divided by borders‖ (Putin 
2014a) caused discussions on the role of nationalism behind Russian national interest formation 
and  foreign policy decision making. With the statement on divided nation, Russian officials 
recognized that there is a gap between what is perceived to be cultural body (self-representation 
as a nation) and territorial body, with cultural body being larger than its territory (Laruelle 2015). 
This further reflects in the way how Russian leadership understands political systems in near 
abroad countries. For example Putin still maintains that Russia has to help neighbouring 
countries to establish stable political systems as they do not have long traditions of statehood 
(Putin 2015b). 
Following Makarychev‘s argument Russia‘s policy is built on the presumption that its 
neighbours are not allowed to conduct independent foreign policy choices (Makarychev 2014). 
By this logic, Russian officials often claim that it is of a ―vital national interest‖ for Russia to 
maintain stability in the post-Soviet space keeping in mind all variety of trans-national threats 
that exist (Putin 2017a). The discourse that it is in Russia‘s interest is to protect Russians living 
abroad is equally argued by Lavrov. According to Lavrov, Russia continues to seriously monitor 
the status of Russians living abroad so they can maintain ties with their ―historical homeland‖ 
and educate their children with ―due respect for their Fatherland‖ (Lavrov 2017a). Russia highly 
maintains the interests in territories which are perceived to be homes to Russian culture and 
Russian speaking populations and protectionist discourse is also espoused by Medvedev in his 
speech on Global Solidarity forum:  
―Russia is a strong and influential nation and we must protect our people, our citizenship, 
and our history and culture. Russian Federation will always stand by you, that it is a 
country that has never left, nor will ever leave its people in the lurch, the way it was in 
South Ossetia and Crimea‖ (Medvedev 2016a).  
The discourse to maintain regional influence in the post-Soviet space and is not new and 
can be traced before Crimea in various ways. I would argue that being the most influential power 
in the near abroad has always been of a central national interest for Russia. However, the manner 
in which Russia plans to maintain that influence has changed. 
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Values play a crucial role in Russian world and it was not a coincidence that 2014 was 
declared as the Year of Culture in Russia, intended to be devoted to enlightenment, respect for 
cultural roots, patriotism and ethics. According to Putin, foundational values for every 
civilization are ―the values of traditional families, real human life, including religious life, not 
just material existence but also spirituality, the values of humanism and global diversity‖ (Putin 
2013c). As the international system is perceived to be unfair, justice became one of the most 
important values in the Russian world: 
 ―You know, the Russian people feel in their hearts and understand in their minds very 
well what is happening. Napoleon once said that justice is the embodiment of God 
on earth. In this sense, the reunification of Crimea with Russia was a just decision‖ (Putin 
2016c). 
What is problematic with this vision of collective identity is that it is presented as a very 
blurry and uncertain concept in the official discourse. However, as Laurelle argued, the Russian 
World is not meant to be a rigid doctrine. It is rather a floating signifier open to all kinds of re-
articulations (Laurelle 2015). Very often political leaders refer to the size of the Russian country 
to stress that Russia has no needs for expansion and others‘ recourses: ―If you look Russia‘s 
place in the world, it is obvious that we have no need for others‘ territory or natural resources‖ 
(Putin 2015a). In the post-annexation period official discourse maintains that Russia has 
a peaceful foreign policy with no desire to restore or rebuild the Soviet Union, rather the Russian 
world is about language, religion, values and preservation of cultural heritage. However, what is 
inconsistent with these representations is the way in which Russia treats the Russian world. For 
example, while he was justifying the decision to annex Crimea, Putin referred to the Russian 
world. He particularly addressed Germans and reminded them that Russia sincerely welcomed 
the idea of German unification even though some nations were opposed.  ―I am confident that 
you have not forgotten this, and I expect that the citizens of Germany will also support 
the aspiration of the Russians, of historical Russia, to restore national unity‖ (Putin 2014a). This 
quotation shows that Putin‘s understanding of Russian world contains expansionism and refers to 
unification with Russians outside Russia, and in this particular case it is with citizens of Crimea.    
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Changing international circumstances 
 
The second part of the analysis will be devoted to changing international circumstances 
that have influenced changes in Russian national interest formation. From a constructivist point 
of view, a country‘s image, prestige and status in international hierarchy play an important role 
in national interests articulation. For Clunan, the way in which Russia perceives the international 
system is largely led by historical memory and status recognition (Clunan 2009). 
For Realists a state‘s international status depends on military might that can be 
demonstrated in a war. On the other hand some schools argue that the recognition of a great 
power status regarding some ―special rights and duties‖ always requires approval from other 
great powers and other states in international system (Larson & Shevchenko 2010). Lebow 
argues that international society legitimised the role of great power. Therefore many activities in 
international relations can be regarded as a competition for high status roles and privileges that 
come with the status. States are also interested to transform from a low-status roles into high-
status ones. Therefore success or failure in the struggle for either regional or international status 
can affect interests and identity of a state (Lebow 2016b). The issue of great power status is of a 
great importance in Russian official discourses and will be discussed in more detail. 
A second important issue that will be discussed is the issue of identity. I argue that a 
chain of events in the international community around annexation of Crimea have influenced the 
way in which Russia perceives itself towards West. Following Makarychev‘s argument the crisis 
triggered the feeling that the structure of East-West relations has permanently changed 
(Makarychev 2014),  I see Ukrainian crisis and annexation of Crimea as a result of unsettled 
identity issues that Russia had with the West. Therefore I argue that the events in 2014 
represented a shock into Russian discursive structures which influenced certain changes in 
Russia‘s interests, identity and concrete policies. I will apply Waever‘s discursive structure 
framework to analyse these issues. However, to the fact that Russia has had difficulties to with 
West has also contributed the possibility that annexation of Crimea was simply a case of  
opportunistically seizing a territory and then formulating an updated set of national interests that 
could be used to justify their actions. 
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Russian place in international system 
 
For Russia, the international system is currently going through the process of global and 
regional instability which leads to increased competitiveness among states (National Security 
Strategy 2015). Global competitiveness particularly regards relations with West. For example the 
National security strategy openly condemns ―the support of the United States and the European 
Union for the anti-constitutional coup d'etat in Ukraine‖ which led to an armed conflict near the 
Russia‘s borders. Discourses towards the West have significantly changed after 2014 because for 
the first time in the official document, the National security strategy explicitly states that the 
West negatively influences the realization of Russian national interests and has aims to create 
different tensions in the Eurasian region (National Security Strategy 2015).  
Russia sees the international situation as uneasy because the post-Soviet phase of Russian 
and global history has now come to an end (Putin 2012f). For Russian officials the struggle for 
global leadership has become more acute than ever before. A Multi-polar world order has 
emerged and actors like Brazil, China, India, or in Putin‘s words ―countries that were looked 
down on only yesterday‖ are making international relations more complex (Putin 2012c).  
Russian leaders are deeply convinced that this complexity makes Russia‘s responsibility for 
maintaining international stability grow. In a polycentric world Russia is one of the key centres 
of world power and this kind of international order provides conditions for Russia‘s gradual yet 
confrontation-free advancement of national interests (Lavrov 2013f). 
Discursive understanding of the Russian position in international society is largely 
influenced by its history and geography. Foreign policy officials constantly refer to their great 
past and size of the country. For example in his inauguration speech Putin said that Russia has 
a ―great past and just as great a future‖ (Putin 2012g). Portrayal of Russia as the largest country 
in the world also plays significant role in Russian understanding of international politics. Putin 
wrote in one of his articles that even tough Russia does not occupy one-sixth of the Earth's 
surface anymore, it is still world's largest nation which has intention to protect its national 
interest by actively and constructively engaging in global politics (Putin 2012e). Furthermore 
this rhetoric is followed by a narrative of how Russian people are brilliant and heroic, and how 
they enjoy the world‘s respect and admiration (Medvedev 2009).  
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For Russian leaders great power status goes naturally with Russia, because their nation 
inherited huge territory, glorious past, outstanding achievements in different spheres from 
science to military and technology. Additionally, Russian leaders perceive their country as a 
crucial member of the international community devoted to achieve more equitable world order 
where justice is respected. However, Russia has been struggling to gain recognition of its 
greatness as Other has the power to deny or attribute certain characteristics to Self. For example 
Putin stated that 2014 was a year of disappointment in Western partners. The connection with the 
events in Ukraine is perceived to be a demonstration of Western rejection of what Russian self 
has become, or in Putin‘s words ―a full international player that has consolidated politically” 
(Putin 2016g). That Russia has become a full international player refers to the long wanted great 
power status recognition. Furthermore when he was asked to comment Obama‘s statement that 
Russia is regional power, Putin answered that the statement is a disrespectful speculation and 
an attempt to prove United States‘ exceptionalism by contrast (Putin 2016c). Even though the 
official governmental position is that Russia does not aspire to be called a superpower (Putin 
2013c)  it is expected that actors in the international system understand that Russia is more than 
just a regional power. Because if someone claims that Russia is a regional power, Putin‘s 
suggestion is first to look at the map and determine to which region to refer to as Russia is part of 
Europe, part of Asia, bordering with China, Japan, United States, even Canada across the Arctic 
Ocean (Putin 2016c) again referring back to the discourse of greatness. 
Status recognition is important for Russia as it fears of the possibility to become 
marginalized as it has powerful neighbours, European Union from the Western side and China 
from the Eastern side. Keeping in mind its economic shortages, Russia constantly argues that 
regardless of economic power, one actor cannot aspire to lead the world or the global economy. 
This standing is followed in the discursive narrative that Russia is considered and respected 
internationally only when it is perceived strong. During 2012 Putin has numerous times repeated 
that Russia should not tempt anyone by allowing itself to be weak (Putin 2012b). Official 
speeches in the beginning of Putin‘s third term are full with rhetoric about the attempts to push 
Russia in the background and to weaken its geopolitical position.  
That Russia officially aspires equal position internationally with major world powers is 
reflected in repetitious rhetoric about multi-polar or polycentric world order (these two concepts 
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are often used as synonyms in the official discourse). Leadership also repeats that no one should 
question Russia‘s position in it due to its military, geographical and economic capabilities, its 
culture and human potential. According to Lavrov, Russia seeks to maintain polycentric world 
order by standing firmly on the position of law and justice (Lavrov 2012). Russian officials often 
emphasise the need to respect the rule of law as they perceive it as a tool which can ensure 
Russia‘s international position. 
Russia seeks that actions of major world powers reflect respect for Russian national 
interests and numerous times Russian leaders repeated that Russian national interests are not 
being taken into consideration. In the official discourse, the Commonwealth of Independent 
States and the Eurasian Economic Union are and have always been a priority for Russian foreign 
policy (Putin 2016e). Additionally as the Russian government sees the CIS as ―a driving force of 
development and as a guarantee of region‘s stability‖(Medvedev 2012c), it is not a surprise that 
they requested to be involved into Ukrainian trade negotiation with European Union. The fact 
that these bilateral negotiations had not transformed into trilateral negotiations Russia perceived 
as disrespect towards Russian interests. Lavrov stated that around crisis in Ukraine it became 
evident that for centuries European countries have felt uncomfortable about ―nascent giant in the 
East‖ and have devoted significant efforts to isolate it from taking part in Europe‘s most 
important affairs (Lavrov 2016). 
One of the main consequences of the manner how Russia perceives respect for its 
national interests resulted in even deeper lack of trust towards West. Trust issue was a problem 
before annexation of Crimea. For example, Lavrov‘s argued that the level of economic, 
education and scientific ties with Europe is tremendous and is consistently growing, however if 
there is a low level of trust in the military and political areas (Lavrov 2013d). For Medvedev, 
Russia and the United States reset everything they could during his presidency (Medvedev 
2012c), but Russia still felt that the United States does not respect Russian interests. For example 
Medvedev argued that the United States employs a ―shoddy doctrine‖ of extended sovereignty 
and that tries to impose its verdicts across the world, and that this kind of acts can provoke both 
symmetric and asymmetric reactions from Russia (Medvedev 2012a). 
The discourse on the lack of trust towards the West became even louder with the Ukraine 
crisis. Lavrov for example argued that  main goal behind the entire Eastern Partnership project 
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was to ―tear the neighbours from Russia, even if it is done artificially and using blackmailing‖ 
(Lavrov 2013c). This kind of rhetoric culminated in 2014 in Putin‘s address to the Federal 
Assembly to incorporate Crimea into Russian Federation:  
―they have lied to us many times, made decisions behind our backs, placed us before 
an accomplished fact. This happened with NATO‘s expansion to the East, as well 
as the deployment of military infrastructure at our borders. They kept telling us the same 
thing: Well, this does not concern you‖ (Putin 2014a). 
Official discursive narrative suggests that Russia acted defensively in 2014 and therefore 
did not provoke any disturbances in the world. For Putin Russia‘s contribution goes only to the 
extent of firm protection of national interests ―We are not attacking in the political sense 
of the word. We are only protecting our interests‖ which simultaneously causes dissatisfaction 
with Western partners (Putin 2014b). It is West who undertook the actions against Russia, 
against Ukraine and against Eurasian integration (Putin 2014a).  
 
 
Identity in the official discourse 
 
This section is built on Hansen‘s argument of the narrative and constitutive adjustment 
between identity, interests and policy
7
. As many constructivist argued in order to understand 
what states want, scholars should start from investigating a country‘s identity and its relation to 
interests. In order to achieve this goal I will apply Waever‘s discursive structure. I argue that 
annexation of Crimea accelerated or even caused changes in concrete policies especially Russian 
turn to Eastern dimension of foreign policy. One part of the international community imposed 
sanctions and excluded Russia from international platforms such Group 8 therefore Russia had to 
accommodate to new international circumstances. These policy changes raised the debates on 
Russian identity and questioned Russian Europeanises. To remind, being naturally European 
would mean that Russia does not need to be tutored as to what constitutes European identity, and 
Russia would feel comfortable with its European identity as France or Germany. 
                                                          
7
 ―Foreign policies are legitimized as necessary, as in the national interest, through reference to identities, yet 
identities are simultaneously constituted and reproduced through formulations of foreign policy‖ (Hansen 2006a, 
p.Preface). 
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There are scholars who claim that Russia is predominantly European. For example 
Morozov‘s identity analysis has led him to claim that there is only one Russia, which is 
European and in its own way civilized (Morozov 2015, p.167). He argues that Russian identity is 
always rooted in European identities because it either accepts them, or uses them as a means to 
create a distinct Russian identity. In this sense, Russia‘s is thoroughly ―Eurocentric‖ as 
references are always to Europe. That Russia is predominantly European seems to be a dominant 
view, but it is important to acknowledge that there are some competing discourses like portrayal 
of Russia as Eurasian country, or arguing that Russia already has its own distinctive 
civilisationsit characteristics.  
The discourses on identity at the very beginning of Putin‘s third term were very 
Eurocentric. Putin claimed that Russian citizens feel and think of themselves as Europeans (Putin 
2012e). Furthermore, that was the time when he proposed the creation of a common human and 
economic space which would connect the Atlantic and the Pacific Ocean, a so called Union of 
Europe. The idea of Union of Europe according to Lavrov, it is not solely supported from the 
Russian side, it is also much discussed topic in Germany and France (Lavrov 2012). In this 
context he quoted French President Charles de Gaulle  in a sense that he was one of the European 
leaders who then spoke about common European space from the Atlantic Ocean to the Urals 
(Lavrov 2013d).  
Putin seemed to be convinced that the European identity of Russia should not be 
questioned as ―Russia is an inalienable and organic part of Greater Europe and European 
civilization (Putin 2012e). Or, as Medvedev argued, the European Union and Russia are partners 
who live in a common European home and have one common European identity (Medvedev 
2013b). This narrative was supported by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, who added that Russia 
belongs to greater European civilization which naturally includes North America (Lavrov 2012). 
European discourse was also supported in Putin‘s article Russia muscles up when he argued that 
the United States is no longer the single centre of power, but on the other hand emerging centres 
of influence are not yet ready to take over. Therefore Russia must play its civilisationist role 
based on a great history but also on distinctive cultural model which ―organically combines the 
fundamental principles of European civilisation and many centuries of cooperation with East‖ 
(Putin 2012f). Putin wanted to make the point that Russia and Europe share same the 
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civilisational values, whereas connection to the East is more technical due to the emergence of 
new economic powers.  
Before the Ukraine crisis, relations with the European Union and Russia were described 
as ―friendly and mutually beneficial.‖ Medvedev stressed many times that the EU is Russia‘s 
largest trade partner with around 400 billion dollars trade turnover, and that probably only the 
United States and China have bigger trade. That is why he also argued that Russia is an 
―exclusive partner‖ to the EU (Medvedev 2013a; Medvedev 2013e).  This discourse 
compliments Lavrov‘s vision that Russia consistently works on the reinforcement of strategic 
partnership relations with the European Union, which is Russia‘s largest economic partner 
(Lavrov 2013a). Medvedev also used the EU to make a positive linkage
8
 in order to explain the 
advantages of the Eurasian Union. Medvedev argued that extensive economic integration can be 
achieved when two nations live side by side and that the EU represents a good example of well 
integrated and fairly safe economies in the long term. Common market, common currency and 
common values create a beneficial environment and show a good example which should be 
followed (Medvedev 2013c). 
That Russia is a European country on one hand, and an Asian country on the other hand 
was widely referred to in the official discourse. It is also argued that Russian interests lie on both 
continents. However, the narrative around the Asian part of Russia is usually followed by the Far 
East question. Medvedev once said this is a ―distant land with a number of difficulties‖ 
(Medvedev 2012b)  which could be a sign for internal othering. Even though the Far East is 
declared to be a development priority of Russia overall, it can be argued that officials realised 
that a lot of work has to be done in order to fit these ‗distant‘ territories into official identity 
discourse.  
One year before the crisis in Ukraine, Medvedev still hold the position that European 
discourse has a central place in Russian identity. His rhetoric was that democracy is a universal 
concept and that Russia does not seek political developments towards human rights and basic 
                                                          
8
 Positive linkage was refered to United states as well. Putin argued that Russia could learn from American 
experience in shaping the consciousness of several generations of Americans through Hollywood because it 
managed to positively link American values and priorities with national interests and public morals (Putin 2012d).  
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freedoms different from the west. Russia is no different from other European countries and does 
not pursue a ―special democratic path based on certain Russian specifics‖ (Medvedev 2013d).  
However, the same year president Putin started the differentiation from Europe during the 
discussion at the Valdai club. For example unlike Russia who is consistently deepening 
integration ties with its neighbours, Europe works on the ―principle of eating from one‘s 
neighbours‘ plate before eating from one‘s own‖. Furthermore he argued that Europe is rejecting 
its roots including the Christian values that represents a foundation of Western civilization (Putin 
2013a). The differentiation from Europe hides also in the narrative that Russia has always tried 
to pursue foreign policy based on equality, mutual respect and consideration of each other's 
interests unlike Russia‘s Western partners who constantly promote principle ―with us or against 
us‖  (Lavrov 2013f). Therefore he started including discourses distancing from Europe such as 
―Russia is returning to itself, to its own history‖, but remaining open and receptive to the best 
ideas and practices of the East and the West (Putin 2013a). 
When the situation around Ukraine started to get complicated in a sense that it was more 
likely that Ukraine will decide to sign the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement with 
the EU, discourse toward Europe started changing. For example, Lavrov said that the turn of 
Russia to the Pacific Ocean, the rise of Siberia and the Far East are national priorities for the 
entire twenty first century because these regions have potential which can ensure dynamic 
development of Russia (Lavrov 2013a). Culmination of a change came with adoption of new 
cultural policy. As Moscow times reported, the Ministry of culture announced new cultural 
policy and its content could be summarized as ―Russia is not Europe‖. This policy argues that 
Russia should be examined as a unique and distinctive civilization due to traditional Russian 
values. It belongs neither to the West nor the East (Golubock 2014). Russia has always sought to 
be a part of European culture. However, according to this policy one has to be blind not to see 
how the modern West withdrew from the culture of ―classical‖ Europe (Министерство 
культуры Российской Федерации 2015).   
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Distancing from Europe (relational position) 
 
National interests depend on the interpretation of identity but identity itself is a fluid 
construct. Therefore I find important to discuss what implications for national interests formation 
has the process of discursive changes of identity. There is an opinion that the annexation of 
Crimea accelerated Russia‘s turn to East. This claim is stipulated by the fact that 2014 was the 
year when Russia‘s relations with the West reached an unprecedented low level since the end of 
Cold War, while relations with China reached unprecedented high level (Lavrov 2014). 
According to some analysts Russia‘s true turn to the East is just beginning and it consists of 
accelerated development of Siberia and the Russian Far East, and of increased presence in the 
Asia Pacific region (Bordachev 2016). However, I argue that discourses on Russian interests in 
the so called ―Turn to East‖ should be carefully examined. 
Official discourse claims that intensifying cooperation with Asian countries does not 
come from a need to find an alternative to the West, it is rather the sign of taking advantages of 
cooperating with countries which have faster economic progress than the rest of the world. For 
example, Putin claims that diversifying energy exports to new markets such as China, Japan, 
India and South Korea was planned long before the Russian economy faced serious troubles 
(Putin 2014b). Not surprisingly, this narrative is supported by the Prime Minister as well in 
claims that Russia must develop an Eastern dimension of foreign policy with countries like 
China, Vietnam, Japan, the Republic of Korea and all other Asian-Pacific nations. For Medvedev 
neglecting this foreign policy vector would have ―strategic consequences‖ as this region 
currently shows remarkable trade and financial potential (Medvedev 2015). Finally Lavrov 
acknowledged that there are many analysis regarding Russia‘s decision to turn towards the East 
considering its relations with the West. However, he claims that Russia‘s policy is exclusively 
based on its national interests, therefore turning away from either Europe or Asia is out of 
question as it would hurt Russia‘s interests and will worsen Russia‘s international standing 
(Lavrov 2016). 
Keeping in mind that Russia is not a country primarily led by economic incentives in the 
international arena, I would argue that a closer look into Russian strategic documents before and 
after the annexation of Crimea shows some silent changes. For example, Foreign Policy Concept 
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from 2013 mentions cooperation with certain Asian countries only within the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) framework.  On the other hand, the latter version of Foreign 
Policy Concept besides a part devoted to cooperation with ASEAN, seems to imply that Russia is 
interested to maintain strategic ties with countries like Vietnam, Japan, North Korea, but also 
Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand. A special part is also devoted to China, India and Iran 
(Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation 2016).  
On the other hand only four European states are mentioned: Germany, Italy, France and 
novelty Spain. The Netherlands and the United Kingdom are no longer mentioned. However, 
concept carefully added that cooperation with other  European countries has substantial potential 
in terms of promoting Russia‘s national interests in European and world affairs (Foreign Policy 
Concept of the Russian Federation 2016). But besides the change in the list of preferred partners 
in European affairs, I find that more significant change is the fact that Russia deleted an 
important indicator of its relations with Europe. In the Foreign Policy Concept from 2013 it was 
clearly written that Russia is ―an integral and inseparable part of European civilization‖ whose 
main task is to create and promote  a common economic and humanitarian space from the 
Atlantic to the Pacific (Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation 2013). New 
concept does not refer to Russia as an inseparable part of European civilization. Now 
establishing a common economic and humanitarian space from the Atlantic to the Pacific with 
EU is a strategic priority for Russia as it can prevent the emergence of dividing lines on the 
European continent. The main interest of Russia now lies in harmonizing and aligning processes 
of European and Eurasian integration. 
In an interview, when he was asked where Russia‘s foreign policy should be oriented: to 
the East or the West, Lavrov had an interesting answer. He said that Russia has no choice as it is 
an enormous country that occupies a huge portion of Eurasia which naturally reflects the 
European and Asian roots of its foreign policy. However, to East and West, he added that 
Russian interests lay in cooperation North (Arctic) and South as well, especially with Chinese 
initiative Silk Road Economic Belt. Lavrov‘s point was that Russia has interests to be 
cooperative and active everywhere  as long as it is on the basis of  equality, mutual respect and 
reciprocal interests (Lavrov 2017c). I would argue that Lavrov used this kind of diplomatic 
rhetoric to make a skilful differentiation from the West as he did a year before in an article 
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Russia‘s Foreign Policy in a Historical Perspective. He argued that ―many prominent Western 
thinkers recognized that historically Rus was part of the European context but Russian people 
always had their own cultural matrix and spirituality and never blended entirely with the West‖ 
(Lavrov 2016). Lavrov seem to lean on Russia‘s ―unique path‖ as often in his speeches he refers 
to a philosopher Nikolai Berdyayev, who argued that Russia has the mission of being a bridge 
between the East and the West. It seems that only Medvedev still maintains the clear idea of 
Russia belonging to European family of nations. He claims that Russia ―will not withdraw from 
Europe economically, politically or in terms of mentality‖. For Medvedev Russia is a European 
power and ―it would be futile to try to break Russia away from the European civilisation and its 
cultural diversity‖ (Medvedev 2015). 
 
 
Turn to East: Change of policies? 
 
As national interests are operationalised through concrete policies I find very important to 
discuss how does the policies influence national interests formation. The policy changes during 
Putin‘s third term (the third discursive layer) are usually analysed within the framework of Sino-
Russian relations. Following Lo‘s argumentation China became the main signifier of Russia‘s 
turn to the East, as most of the activities in Russian foreign policy are directed towards China 
(Lo 2015). Following Lo‘s arguments, different narratives developed on Chinese importance 
during the Ukraine crisis. One of them is that Russia was ―forced to turn to East due to Western 
hostility―. Lo sees partnership with China as the main hope for Russian government to leverage 
Western governments (Lo 2015, p.142). Therefore I find it necessary to discuss Russian interests 
in this relationship. 
Officially in Russia Sino-Russian relations are labelled as ‖a comprehensive partnership 
and strategic cooperation― which increased unprecedentedly in terms of level and substance 
(Putin 2016b). That Russia has the interest to cooperate with China is proven by different levels 
of cooperation. This includes major energy trade deal, building ―Power of Siberia‖ pipeline, 
Russia became China‘s number one oil supplier, trade has increased due to currency swap 
arrangements that these two countries signed, and Russia has become one of the five largest 
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recipients of Chinese outbound direct investment in relation to the Belt and Road Initiative which 
connects Asia and Europe (Savic 2016).  
This increased cooperation has influenced either the opinion that Russian relations with 
China are very fragile and uncertain, or that relations between these two countries will soon 
transform into to an anti-Western alliance. However, I would argue that the real essence of 
Russia‘s turn to the East is more complex. Overestimating the extent of a Russian turn to the East 
should be avoided because this turn resulted in asymmetrical rather the equal rapprochement. 
Russia found itself again in an uncertain international terrain and is trying to exploit relations as 
much as possible. I would also add that the uncertainty of Russia‘s turn to the East comes from 
the complex situation on Asian continent. 
In the after Crimean discourse, Asia is seen a vital partner (Medvedev 2014) and Russia 
claims powerful friend in China. Putin is grateful that China understands Russian moves in 
Ukraine (Putin 2014a), and therefore argues that ―it is common knowledge that Russia and China 
have very close relations‖ (Putin 2016f). Official discourse claims that the bounds that Russia 
and China have developed over recent years are more than a simple strategic partnership (Putin 
2016f). This discourse is supported by Medvedev‘s rhetoric who claims that China and Russia 
are ―truly friends‖ who share a common approach to many international issues and implement 
large projects through organizations such as Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and 
BRICS, including the alignment of the Eurasian Economic Union and the Silk Road Economic 
Belt (Medvedev 2016b).  Therefore the core principle in this partnership is discursively 
portrayed as friendly.  
As the principle of reciprocity is of a great importance in Russian discourse, I assume that 
it is very important that Chinese discourse goes in similar direction. For example Russia is the 
country that Chinese president has visited the most, and Xi Jinping said that he maintains the 
closest ties with Putin among all foreign leaders (Jinping 2017). Jinping also described relations 
with Russia as friendly ―we are reliable friends always eager to help and support one another‖ 
(Jinping 2017). More importantly Junping addresses openly Russia as a great power country: 
―Our cooperation is underpinned by the core principles of mutual respect, equality and mutual 
benefit. This is an essential feature of the relations between our two countries as great powers‖ 
(Jinping 2017). That is why Putin started characterising Russian-Chinese relations as a ―special 
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strategic partnership‖ (Putin 2016a). According to Putin, the level of trust that Russia currently 
has with China is on the higher level than ever before  (Putin 2016a). Therefore it can be argued 
that the lack of trust with West has accelerated Russian discourses of high levels of trust with 
China. 
Referring to China as a friend and lack of discourses on China as a threat in post Crimean 
period is significant, especially if we keep in mind that Putin once said ―I do not want to 
dramatize the situation, but if we do not make every real effort, the Russian population will soon 
speak mostly Japanese, Chinese, and Korean‖ (quoted in Tsygankov, 2016, p 152). Keeping in 
mind Far East anxiety, and potential rivalry in Central Asia it can be argued that Russia carefully 
works on establishing good relations with China‘s opponents. For example, before the Crimean 
crisis, Russia devoted significant efforts to enhance relations with Japan. As a consequence of 
annexation, Japan joined sanctions against Russia which influenced on deterioration of relations. 
However Putin openly said that the interests of the Russian Federation include the normalisation 
of relations with Japan, which is not at the bottom of the agenda as Russia is interested to create 
an atmosphere of trust (Putin 2016a).  
Following Teper‘s argument Putin spoke of Russia‘s ―European calling‖ and Russia‘s 
place in ―the common European home‖ but there was no ―Asian calling‖, common home, 
common culture, or common civilization (Teper 2016). The lack of civilisationist connection in 
the official discourses towards Asia is replaced by economic cooperation with China and other 
Asia-Pacific countries. In that sense Initiative on Greater Eurasian Partnership that would include 
member states of SCO, ASEAN, CIS and Belt and Road Initiative was proposed (Lavrov 2017b). 
Russia has been trying to intensify its presence in various economic initiatives in Asia however 
Russia is still very careful when producing civilisationist discourses. Therefore Russia‘s interests 
in cooperation with Asian countries are still very pragmatic. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
This thesis aims to unpack the meanings behind Russian national interests during Putin‘s 
third term. In order to achieve this goal, I proposed a research question How has the annexation 
of Crimea changed discourses on Russian national interests formation, with a sub question How 
coherent are discourses on national interests represented by Russian official. As the time frame I 
set period of Putin‘s third term with a middle point of 2014 when the annexation of Crimea 
occurred. Combining constructivist theoretical approach and poststructuralist methodology I 
tried to answer these questions. 
 
How has the annexation of Crimea changed discourses on Russian national interests 
formation? 
Various factors can influence changes in the way in which national interests are 
formulated. I identified that among others, ideas on national sovereignty, the Russian world, 
Russia‘s place in the international system, and ideas on identity orientation influenced national 
interest formation between 2012 and 2017 in Russia.  
I identified that Russia has changed discourses on national sovereignty. Before the 
annexation of Crimea, one of the most important foreign policy goals for Russia was to be a 
leader in the field of international law. Many times Russia has criticized Western interventionism 
for not respecting sovereignty and territorial integrity. Therefore officials produced discourses 
such as Russia defends its national interests without being involved into any confrontation, 
unacceptability of excessive use of force, Russia does not seek domination neither in region nor 
in the world. However, by supporting separatists in Eastern Ukraine, and with the annexation of 
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Crimea, Russia has challenged the principle of non-interference and has given priority to the 
principle of self-determination. Empirical analysis showed inconsistency between Russian key 
strategic documents and the ongoing understanding of national interests as Russia has tried to 
justify the annexation of Crimea by the ―inviolability of self-determination‖ even though main 
principles in Foreign policy concept from 2013 were sovereignty and territorial integrity. 
The second conclusion is that the influence of the Russian world doctrine in its 
expansionist form triggered the redefinition of national interests during Putin‘s third term. 
Changes in discourses on sovereignty were followed by the changes of discourses on values that 
refer to spirituality and morality. Russia has been trying to establish the Russian world as a 
cultural unit in the polycentric world order in order to deal with civilisational struggle with the 
West. But the concept has developed to have several meanings in the official discourse, therefore 
boundaries of the Russian world are not known. During the timeframe under study the lack of the 
national idea is presented to be one of the most important issues that Russia has to solve ―there 
has been no progress on questions about who we are and who we want to be‖ (Putin 2013a). 
Even though in the official discourse it is not clear who Russia wants to be, for Putin it is clear 
that Russia is one of the biggest nations divided by borders. Therefore another inconsistency is 
noted: the Russian world is presented as a concept about language, religion, values and 
preservation of cultural heritage. However, comparison of German unification with the Crimean 
case showed that the parts of Ukraine have become included in dominant thinking about Russian 
nation. This added expansionist element into Russian world concept.  
The international situation also plays an important role in national interests formation. 
Russia sees the international situation as uneasy as it is perceived that the post-Soviet phase of 
Russian and global history has now come to an end. Without a doubt discourse on Russia as a 
great power has been incorporated into Russian national interests and the annexation of Crimea 
has not changed the fact that Russia perceives itself in the great power terms. However 
discursive portrayal of Russia as a great power seems a bit different after the annexation of 
Crimea. It seems that for the governmental elite, Russia is perceived as a status maintainer or, in 
Putin‘s words Russia has become ―a full international player that has consolidated politically‖ 
(Putin 2016g). Therefore large criticism is directed towards the West for constantly trying to 
prevent Russia from achieving and protecting its national interests.  
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Finally, identity has played an important role in Russian national interest formation. 
Based on empirical evidence, without a doubt the consequences of the annexation of Crimea 
have accelerated Russian devotion to Eastern dimension of foreign policy. Even though Russian 
officials claim that the development of cooperation in Asia is part of a long term strategy planned 
before the events in Ukraine, I argued that the response that Russia got from the West after the 
annexation has had the predominant influence. Using Waever‘s discursive structure model, in 
this case I argued that the change happened first in the second layer. Relational position between 
Russia and West has changed which prompted the changes in policies (third layer). Russia has 
intensified cooperation in various directions such as trade, infrastructure projects and energy 
deals. The dependence on Chinese purchasing power is growing and Russia has the interest to 
maintain good relations with its eastern neighbour, but also with other Asian countries in order to 
diversify its policies and to counterbalance Chinese influence. Referring back to Waever‘s 
argument that it is the most difficult to change or politicise the core layer, I also found out that 
only silent changes occurred in the core layer of Russian identity. For example the discourses on 
identity at the very beginning of Putin‗s third term European discourse had a central place in 
Russian identity. When the crisis in Ukraine started the discourses like ―Russia is returning to 
itself‖ became more feasible. Then in 2014 Ministry of Culture announced new cultural policy 
which argues that Russia is a distinctive civilization due to traditional Russian values. It belongs 
neither to the West nor the East. Discourses on civilisation distinctiveness are noticeable, but for 
example even in the post-Crimean period for Medvedev ―Russia is a European power and it 
would be futile to try to break Russia away from the European civilisation diversity‖ (Medvedev 
2015). Finally, Russia has reoriented a significant part of trade and energy policies towards East 
but has been very careful on producing discourses on civilisational similarity with countries 
Asian countries like China. However changes in relational position towards West influenced 
changes of Russian relational position toward China and Russia now claims a powerful friend in 
China. It seems that Russia has entered in uncertain terrain with no clear international 
orientation.  
To conclude, territory is one of the most important elements of each state. Therefore 
when a state decides to change its borders it goes through the process of explanation and 
legitimization for the particular move. Such policies are usually legitimized through the notion of 
national interests. National interests depend on the interpretation of identity but identity itself is a 
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fluid construct. Due to the changes that stem from domestic circumstances as well as from the 
changes that stem from international environment, Russia has changed the way in which it 
understands self and its nation. What can stem from here is that Russia still has not built a clear 
idea of its nation, therefore the very idea of the nation remains blurred and uncertain and this 
uncertainty will leave national interests as a vague concept. 
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